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Introduction
BRUCE S. ROGOW*
We intially conceived the Nova Conference on Public Interest Practice
in Florida as an educational and a supportive meeting. It was to pro-
vide an opportunity for public interest lawyers to learn new develop-
ments in the law and, perhaps more importantly, the Conference was
to encourage new members of the Bar to become engaged in public
interest practice.
I am not sure how much substantive law anyone took away from
the Conference, although the opportunity was provided. I am not sure
how many new entrants were recruited into the field, although we tried
to encourage them with wonderful tales of success and attorney's fees
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act.
I am sure that those already engaged in public interest practice in
Florida left feeling invigorated and ready to pursue new frontiers.
There was a spirit of community among the participants which re-
flected the closeness which has developed among a small number of
Florida lawyers who have, for the past fifteen years, made Florida pub-
lic interest practice a growth industry.
Some of the people whose views are on the next few pages are
among that group. Tobias Simon, supervisor of the Nova Experimental
Federal Litigation Program, was the founder, in 1966, of a federally
funded legal services program in Miami which spawned a host of im-
portant law reform cases and which created another propram, Florida
Rural Legal Services, the state's largest legal services program. Dan
Bradley, now President of the Legal Services Corporation, began his
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. Professor Rogow began his
public interest practice in Mississippi in 1965 and 1966, representing civil rights work-
ers. He returned to Florida (he is a graduate of the University of Florida College of
Law) and was Assistant Director of Legal Services of Greater Miami until 1972. From
1972 to 1975 he taught at the University of Miami and came to Nova when the Law
School opened in 1975. During the past decade, Professor Rogow has argued over 75
public interest cases in various state and federal appellate courts, including six cases in
the Supreme Court of the United States.
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public interest practice in Florida Rural Legal Services.
Chesterfield Smith has for years served as a pillar of reassurance
for all of us who have felt ostracized in our roles as public interest
advocates. When we felt no sympathy or understanding from the or-
ganized bar, there was Chesterfield, ABA President elect, ABA Presi-
dent, ABA former President, taking up our cause, attending American
Civil Liberties Union dinner, lending his name to fairness.
This is a good state for the public interest practitioner. People like
Chesterfield, Toby, Dan, and a long list of other Florida lawyers have
kindled an ongoing commitment to legal progress, although some
pockets of legal provincialism remain. But on balance, one must recog-
nize the increasing quality of our state trial and appellate judges, and
the fact that more and more, these appointments are coming from the
ranks of people who have shown a commitment to the poor, to minori-
ties, to the aged and the handicapped.
Alan Morrision's remarks, and Chief Justice England's Isaac
Asimov-like opinion, look to the days of deregulation and free-market
competition for legal services. Their ideas are thought provoking and
the time they describe may come, but for the thousands of people in
Florida who are too poor to afford a lawyer, or too handicapped by
physical, emotional or societal barriers, the words of Dan Bradley and
Chesterfield offer more solace.
So read the views of our friends and come to your own conclu-
sions. We at Nova look forward to a future in which our graduates will
play a vital role in shaping public interest practice in the next century,
whatever form that practice takes.
1342
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A Visionary Opinion*
THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. ENGLAND JR.
Chief Justice
The Supreme Court of Florida
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION OF MORE
THAN TWENTY-FIVE ATTORNEYS
TO PARTIALLY DE-INTEGRATE
THE FLORIDA BAR
PER CURIAM
By petition filed pursuant to Article XIII of the Integration Rule, more
than twenty-five members in good standing of The Florida Bar asked
the Court to partially de-integrate the bar-that is, to eliminate the
compulsory membership requirement first imposed by the Court in
1949 for persons eligible to practice civil law in Florida. The petition is
both supported and opposed by persons, groups and governmental
units too numerous to list. The arguments arrayed by both sides are
carefully developed, well documented and artfully expressed, and
because these efforts have greatly facilitated the very sensitive task we
are now called upon to perform, it seems appropriate to summarize the
majority positions asserted.
The petitioning attorneys' basic premise for this proceeding is that
regulation of the civil side of the legal profession by the Court is no
longer necessary or desirable, in light of the limited number of bar
members practicing civil matters and the narrow range of matters
which require any form of legal representation. This premise is
* Presented before the Conference on Public Interest Practice in Florida;
"Practicing Law for Love and Money," Nova University Center for the Study of Law,
November 17, 1979.
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historically based, reflecting evolutionary developments in the practice
of law not only in Florida but throughout many industrialized societies.
Those opposing the petition also take a historical view, basically
contending that there are good reasons why attorneys have been, and
should continue to be, governed by the Court in civil matters, no
matter how few there are or what legal representation they provide.
It is not essential that we recount here the early history of the
legal profession as it developed in Great Britain and in the United
States. We accept as accurate respondents' showing that the profession
was, in form and substance, regulated by the courts as to civil matters
even from earliest times, when a small number of lawyers delivered a
relatively narrow class of legal services to a limited group of clients.
Nor is it essential to restate the original reasons, still valid today,
which underlay that regulatory interest by the judiciary. On the other
hand, to understand petitioners' argument it is necessary to recount
several Florida milestones affecting the delivery of legal services since
1949.
As mentioned, the profession was "integrated" in 1949, requiring
membership in the bar for all who would practice law in the state.
From an initial statewide membership of 2,700 paying annual dues of
$25 per person or $67,500 in the aggregate, the organized bar grew to a
membership in 1979 of 25,681, paying annual dues of $125 per person
or $3,210,125 in the aggregate. (The year 1979 was selected because the
1970s were significant ones, as will be shown.) Legal services
performed by the bar on the civil side during this period included,
principally, tort (including personal injury) litigation, compensation for
workers' injuries, real property transactions, and family matters, such
as marriage dissolution, child custody and the like.
Legal services in these areas of law had historically been available
only to the affluent. A relatively recent set of pressures altered that,
however, to compel increasing availability of civil legal services to
poorer persons. In the 1960s, legal aid organizations and public interest
law firms emerged as vehicles to provide personalized civil
representation to the poor and to broaden constitutional rights through
attacks on those laws which, it was believed, disadvantaged poor
persons generally. Governmental entry into the delivery of legal
services to the poor, through such organizations as the Office of
Economic Opportunity, the Legal Services Corporation, Florida Legal
Services, Inc., and Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc., was a hallmark
Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss2/1
A Visionary Opinion
1 4:1980
345 I
of the 1970s.
Before and during the 1970s, other means for providing civil legal
assistance on a broad basis had evolved in Florida. These included: (i)
contingent legal fees for personal injury claims and for prevailing
parties in claims of deceptive and unfair trade practices, (ii) a
comprehensive compensation scheme for work-related injuries, (iii)
prepaid legal insurance plans, (iv) summary court procedures for
relatively small civil claims, and (v) neighborhood justice centers for
the resolution of minor disputes. Outside Florida, other means were
being devised toward the same end, such as California's 1979
legislation requiring arbitration as a prerequisite to a court proceeding
for all civil claims under $1,500. These mechanisms, of course, were
the first primitive manifestations of an emerging awareness that courts
were virtually inaccessible to the poor, and that, among citizens and
residents of America, access to civil justice was vastly disparate.
A serious access to justice movement began in the 1980s, leading
inevitably to the now-familiar dispacement of non-traditional legal
services. Open advertising by lawyers drove down the costs of
providing certain legal services in the early 1980s, although this feature
of the access movement was not widely used in Florida and inevitably
lost momentum when mounting inflation forced even the law clinics to
raise their fees. In 1981 this Court directed that all Florida attorneys,
as a requisite to the annual renewal of their bar memberships, be open
and available to members of the public for one half hour of free
consultative services each month. This innovation, which was inspired
by the 1979 Report of Great Britain's Royal Commission began with a
voucher system for minimal compensation from funds generated by
interest on lawyers' trust accounts. Like so many other tentative steps
toward affordable justice which were geared to compensate attorneys
for the delivery of legal services, however, this methodology eventually
gave way to the record-less, non-compensable, hour-per-week "open
office" plan which the bar ultimately asked us to approve.
In 1982, this Court determined that, in order to serve the public
interest better, Florida law professors should be paid from bar dues
income to provide consultation in certain fragmented but repetitive
administrative matters such as welfare claims, disability controversies,
and state employment and hiring disputes. The now familiar "public
service consultation provision" eventually became a standard feature of
law faculty contracts, thus providing full and free representation in a
' II
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broad range of administrative and non-administrative legal matters,
without any demonstration of indigency or hardship.
By 1983, the access movement turned from the growing costs of
underwriting legal services to less costly alternatives. In that year the
Court relaxed the definition of the "practice of law" to approve the
establishment of "socio-legals"-persons receiving a one-year,
combined training course offered by the graduate and law facilities at
Florida institutions-to make available lower cost, unregulated
counselling services in matrimonial and juvenile matters. One year
later, the Florida Legislature partially de-judicialized dissolution of
marriage, following the British model from the early 1970s, to allow
court-approved consent filings which required no legal representations.
After another four years, as we know, this tentative step gave way to
the procedure which had long been in existence in Japan, by which
matrimonial dissolutions took the same form as marriages and
required only a simple, non-judicial filing with the registry of vital
statistics. This last step, of course, is now recognized as having been an
important feature of the so-called "first wave of de-legalization."
A second major feature of the emerging first wave was the
elimination of the need for legal representation in tort and workmen's
injury matters. This came about as a result of the adoption in 1988 of
Florida's comprehensive injury compensation system, modelled after
the one adopted in 1974 in New Zealand. Under this system, all
injuries, without regard to fault or relationship to job, became
compensable by the state through wage loss supplements obtained
simply by filing a claim with the state's division of income assurance.
A third feature of the first wave, made possible primarily by
technological advances, came about as a result of the 1989 statute on
land transfers, under which the state's computerized land registry
allowed instantaneous and reliable title transfers without the need for
legal representation.
Parallel developments, arising principally from technological
improvements and from the 1970s movement toward lay representation
on professional regulatory boards, combined to bring about the so-
called "second wave of de-legalization." Only the three principal
developments of the second wave need be identified here.
First, in 1985, the Court put non-lawyer members on the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners and on the bar's Board of Governors. This
step was followed in 1991 by the Court's adoption of election
1 346 4:1980 1
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procedures for the bar similar to those enacted by the legislature for
other regulated professions. Under these procedures, the division of
elections simply conducts open local elections for members of the
Board of Governors, without any proportionality requirement for
attorney members.
Second, in 1987, the Court took initial steps toward computerized
jury selection procedures. This led, quickly and inevitably, to the
present system under which persons throughout the state perform jury
service from their homes through interconnected, video transmitter/
receivers in the form of small boxes connected by court personnel to
juror's home television sets for trial purposes.
The third feature of the so-called second wave is now sometines
called the "appearance of justice," or the "demystification" wave, of
the access to justice movement. It began, of course, in 1979, when this
Court opened Florida's courtrooms to the electronic media and
displayed to citizens nationwide the realities of the operation of the
judicial branch of government.
The cumulative consequence of the second wave, as we now know,
led rather rapidly to further inexpensive, convenient and workable legal
fusions (too numerous to mention here), from which evolved an
expanding relaxation of historical "practice of law" doctrines.
These historical highlights provide the backdrop for petitioners'
argument to the Court today that we should inaugurate a "third wave"
of the access to justice movement-bodily asserted to be the final or
"free access" wave-by deregulating the civil bar and by allowing
attorneys at law to compete freely with other business people and
professionals in providing civil justice in the few areas of human
relations which still require a law license. Petitioners recognize that
there are areas on the civil side of the law in which attorneys may
continue to assist the courts in the performance of their
responsibilities-setting policy through class actions, passing on the
constitutionality of statutes, resolving contract impairment problems,
and the like-but they argue that the small number of practitioners
available or needed for these matters can operate under the direct
supervision of the courts before whom they practice, as when our
country was formed, without the more elaborate trappings of a
compulsory, organized bar association.
The mere recitation of developments in the law since the 1960s
illustrates amply the serious and difficult nature of petitioners' cause. It
9
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is precisely because of the gravity and difficulty of this matter that we
have unanimously decided not to act at this time, but rather to refer
this question to The Florida Bar for further analysis. We turned to the
bar in 1979, through our Furman decision, to devise new ways to
expand the delivery of legal service to the disadvantaged. In 1980, the
bar demonstrated to the legislature that general Court supervision over
a representative governing board for Florida's attorneys had been over
the years both an effective and a responsive regulatory scheme which
should be preserved. We are confident that the public interest will best
be served if we again turn to the organized bar to reconsider the entire
subject of the delivery of human services to the less affluent, and to
advise the Court, not later than January 1, 1999, whether an integrated
civil bar is any longer necessary or desirable.
It is so ordered.
Filed July 1, 1998
ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.
1 348 4:1980 1
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The old lawyer said:
"I look out for my paying clients."
The young lawyer responded:
"But good lawyers must also
do some free public service."
CHESTERFIELD SMITH*
Does an ethical lawyer have an obligation to give some portion of pro-
fessional time for free public service? Is a lawyer required to render
free professional service with the same professional dedication as is
owed to a lawyer's paying client? Is it time for an evolutionary pro-
gress in lawyer ethics by now imposing peer pressure on those who
unreasonably ignore that lofty obligation of lawyers? Should those law-
yers who after notice and hearing repeatedly refuse to assume their
part of that professional obligation henceforth be chastised by the or-
ganized Bar? I would answer each question with a qualified "Yes".
Many individual lawyers do not discharge, in any substantial way,
what I perceive to be an existing professional obligation to improve the
law, to enhance the administration of justice, and to make better the
services of the legal profession. The grandiose legend often voiced at
Bar meetings that local lawyers, as needed, will roll up their sleeves
and give unselfishly of their time to do that which lawyers ought to do,
unfortunately, is a mere fantasy.
A good lawyer, as a member of a learned profession, quite clearly
should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for paying clients,
and a good lawyer should employ that added knowledge in the better-
ment of the law. Indubitably, that truism long has been a part of lawy-
ering. Indeed, a good lawyer almost by definition must be continually
mindful of current deficiencies in the administration of justice and
without personal reward continually work for better courts, more qual-
* Past President, American Bar Association. Presented before the Conference on
Public Interest Practice in Florida; "Practicing Law for Love and Money," Nova Uni-
versity Center for the study of Law, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., November 16, 1979.
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ified judges, and fairer and more expeditious legal procedure. A good
lawyer must, too, be cognizant that many people still cannot afford
adequate legal assistance and that the good lawyer should now, as in
the past, devote professional time in their behalf. Today a good lawyer
must be equally aware that there are many other areas which cry out in
equally loud voices for the lawyer's distinctive talents, places where so-
cietal legal requirements presently are not fully met.
The fact that some good lawyers have provided legal services to
the poor at no compensation, as in legal aid, or for reduced compensa-
tion, as in government sponsored legal service programs, cannot validly
be used by the mass of lawyers not so participating as a shield against
the rendering of free public service themselves. The indigent client,
while significant, is only a part of the problem; a part in which the
government recently, and quite properly, has assumed a far greater re-
sponsibility than the legal profession.
Working free part-time is admittedly not the best way to achieve
lasting economic success, even if such free work be labeled "public ser-
vice." Many magnificent lawyers over the years have rendered to the
public substantial service without receiving pecuniary compensation.
But we must acknowledge that not all, or even most, have. Thus, it
seems to me suitable, proper, seemly, and timely, that the organized
legal profession formally recognize that each lawyer presently has an
obligation for some free public service which, if unreasonably ignored,
warrants professional sanctions.
Heretofore it perhaps has been professionally acceptable for some
lawyers to serve only paying clients. But, if that is so, a new profes-
sional standard is aborning. The substantial recognition which has been
afforded in years past to those lawyers who have ground away at their
clients' demands day after day and year after year, tending to the store,
never leaving the office, minding what has been traditionally styled
"their own business" is undergoing substantial change. No longer can
the old lawyer, or the young, look out only for paying clients. No
longer can the legal profession merit public approbation under a ran-
dom and haphazard standard that lets some lawyers do good and some
do not so good. The fact that some lawyers still majestically do what
good lawyers of a different day andtime did as a complete discharge of
their professional engagements cannot exonerate today's lawyers from
providing free public service. Lawyers who work with no compensation
or with substantially reduced compensation in order to mitigate the
1350
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problems of the indigent are, and always will be, rendering valuable
public service. Even so, the entire legal profession has a duty to do
those essential, but now often neglected, societal activities best per-
formed by lawyers which do not result in pecuniary benefit.
The parameters of lawyer free public service henceforth must be
as broad and flexible as the minds of those who will discharge that
responsibility. That obligation extends to fulfilling essential legal needs
of all Americans, rich or poor, young or old, male or female, black or
white, happy or sad, gracious or surly, individuals or groups, all people
whoever or for whatever reasons. If that obligation is to be met, each
lawyer must help.
A lawyer's contribution to the public interest through free public
service can never be judged by what was achieved or by the monetary
value of the service contributed. In all events, that priceless and unique
measure of professional devotion, contributed time, must be a prime
factor in the determination of whether a lawyer fully has discharged
those obligations of free public service. Each lawyer must perform that
individual duty, no one else can. Financial contributions, no matter
how extensive, cannot discharge the individual lawyer's professional
obligation for free public service. The legal profession is not an elitist
one in which the economically successful can buy amnesty for not do-
ing what all lawyers are obligated to do. Indeed, if the law truly is to
remain the very special and unique profession that it historically has
been, those obligations must be non-transferable.
A major difficulty in lawyers contributing to the public free profes-
sional service is in striking the proper balance between that profes-
sional time devoted for public service and that professional time needed
for the economic necessities which face all professional people. Up to
now, those many lawyers who long have acknowledged some responsi-
bility for free public service, both individually and collectively, have
had no organizational guidance as to the type or extent of activities
that will discharge that obligation.
The collective responsibility of lawyers must be translated into a
defined professional duty such that each lawyer, individually, can
render a share of the needed free public service. If that ethical demand
is plainly enunciated, without equivocation or ambivalence, the deci-
sional process now universally utilized by the organized Bar in estab-
lishing ethical boundaries will, in time, evolve definite guidelines for its
application. Through trial and error and through experimentation, law-
L r
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yers ultimately can develop a revised code of professioanl responsibility
which incorporates the who, how, what, and when of the free public
service that society should receive in exchange for its grant of the ex-
clusive privilege to practice law.
There are, of course, inherent difficulties in an adjudication of pro-
fessional performance involving such subjective considerations as work
habits, job requirements, organization and self-discipline, intelligence,
employment restraints, public responsibilities, integrity, personal char-
acter, and professional know-how. However, perplexity in enforcement
has never prevented the organized Bar from adopting ever stricter
standards.
Certainly, lawyers have individual characteristics and practice de-
mands which will prevent them from being "equal" in all professional
contributions. Lawyers, of necessity, must be judged on their subscrip-
tions to free public service with a full recognition of their differing cir-
cumstances. In some cases, those free public service activities might
embrace extensive work within the organized Bar itself, such as disci-
plinary activities or law reform. In others, it might mean working with
a public interest law firm, rendering legal services to those who are
unable to obtain those services through the normal means of delivery,
or representing charitable organizations. To some lawyers, perhaps free
public service might well involve maintaining and enhancing the legal
competence of other lawyers, working to improve the availability and
delivery of legal services, helping with civil rights law or poverty law,
working as a defender of those charged with crime who are unable to
secure competent counsel, or representing diffused interests in adver-
sary proceedings involving the public at large. Almost certainly, ethical
recognition of public service must encompass at least a modicum of
activity designed to improve, through constitutional or statutory revi-
sion, the justice system as a unit. Many legitimate legal interests in
fields such as the environment, welfare, consumer protection, civil lib-
erties, privacy, and the poor remain either not represented or under-
represented before legislatures, executive agencies, and courts.
The best way to measure the individual free public service required
of a lawyer will vary from area to area and perhaps between different
branches of the law. Additionally, there will be multiple areas of free
public service other than those few that I have suggested, which as al-
ternatives or supplements, are better suited to both society and the le-
gal profession. Only a lawyer's peer group should determine whether
4:1980 1352
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various activities reported to the organized Bar as having been per-
formed by a particular lawyer on a recurring and substantial basis are
among those things which freely should have been contributed to the
public weal. In all such determinations, diversity and experimentation
must be fostered and supported. There is no single approach. Through
variety, through trial and error, and through evolution, the organized
Bar best can gain a proper understanding of the ways in which individ-
ual lawyers most meaningfully may render generous public service.
Society long ago made a determination that a fiercely independent
and unshackled legal profession is essential to our system of govern-
ment and to the individual rights of its citizens. It placed lawyers in a
posture to be both free and independent by establishing a monopoly for
those who practice law. In granting to lawyers that privilege, the nur-
turing of certain skills utilized extensively in the practice of law-such
as advocacy, counseling, negotiating and drafting-were chilled and
perhaps denied to non-lawyer members of society. The grant of mo-
nopolistic privileges by society to a limited number of people to render
specialized professional services always creates an obligation to make
available to society those special skills nurtured by that monoply.
The legal profession can best perform if its mores, customs, stan-
dards and offices are self-determined. If a legal monoply is a viable
societal institution, lawyers, in order to support that monopoly and to
preserve self-regulation, must fill those essential public needs which will
not otherwise be met, including the rendering of those distinct services
which the monopoly itself makes lawyers peculiarly qualified to
perform.
Some ethical restructuring should occur soon. Otherwise, the mul-
tiple ways in which lawyers presently render professional services will
perhaps be curtailed. Lawyers' patrons-the populace as a whole-may
already be near a conclusion that their interest will be best served if
other professionals, or para-professionals, share in at least some of the
work which traditionally has been performed only by lawyers.
While lawyers do owe other individual lawyers courtesy and integ-
rity in their dealings, lawyers owe individual lawyers who are profes-
sionally unworthy absolutely nothing. The organized Bar is not an ex-
clusive club and its members cannot be mutually protective. Those who
do their professional part can no longer preserve those who do not. The
organized legal profession is not and cannot be merely a trade guild. It
must be an organization of learned professionals banded together more
| !
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effectively to serve the public as a whole. Those who do not do, as
lawyers, what they ought to do, harm those lawyers who do what they
ought to do, and they should no longer be tolerated.
The ethical progression by the organized Bar which I here suggest
is obtainable. In my own time, I have seen disciplinary measures for
particular ethical violations evolve from clucking disapproval to disbar-
ment. Initially, in my experiences as a Bar official, I joined with others
in refusing to discipline lawyers for negligence. The professional incom-
petence of a member of the Bar was not even discussed then as grounds
for disciplinary sanctions. Indeed, it was rationalized that to do so
would be contrary to the Supreme Court order certifying that lawyer
as competent. All of that has changed, for me and for the organized
Bar. In most jurisdictions, repeated or gross negligence by a lawyer
now warrants the severest censure. No longer does the profession allow
marginal lawyers to repeatedly accept legal matters which they cannot
competently and proficiently handle.
What is now needed is, in essence, a contribution of free public
service. Each lawyer, for the first time, must be required to contribute
in a definite, prescribed, and recurring amount, as fixed from time to
time by the lawyer's peers, an amount somewhat in the nature of tith-
ing professional time but not to exceed one-tenth. Such a commitment
by the legal profession, while substantial, inevitably would result in dis-
tributing the ever-burgeoning burden of free public legal service more
equitably among all members of the profession. That required free
public service can be provided by the highly diversified legal profession
in the multiple forms referred to above. But quite obviously, the overall
obligation must be shared by each individual lawyer if the job is to be
well done.
My thesis is a simple one: If the legitimate aspirations of society
in creating the profession of lawyer are to be realized, the title "law-
yer" must denote to all people integrity, unity, courage, specialized
competence, and unselfish involvement in essential public service. It
does not now.
The public should know that each lawyer is interested in more
than making money, in more than personal aggrandizement, in more
than achieving public recognition. They should know that the least of
lawyers is interested in serving well the public good, in filling the par-
tial void in special skills created in society long ago when the lawyer,
by governmental edict, was given the monopoly for legal services. They
4:19801
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should know that the Bar, as a quasi-public institution is stalwart and
not supine, that it is willing to eliminate from its ranks those lawyers
who do not do their part.
The ethical codes of lawyers, being aspirational standards of pro-
fessional performance at the top and being disciplinary rules governing
lawyer conduct at the bottom, have developed by usage to require ever
more of those persons who wear the legal mantle-and so they should.
Lawyers always should, indeed they must, as they traditionally have,
live nobly in the law.
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The Private Bar and the Public Lawyer:
An Essential Partnership
DAN J. BRADLEY*
Historically, the leadership and momentum for making legal services
available to the poor came from the organized bar. Public interest law
emerged with the first legal aid society in New York City in 1876, and
its development was fostered in the mid-1960's by the creation of the
first publicly funded effort under the auspices of the Offices of Eco-
nomic Opportunity Legal Services Program. It is now the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation that is the movement's successor.
Today, fifteen years after the publicly funded poverty law move-
ment began, there are over 6,000 full-time lawyers and more than
2,000 paralegals working in about 1,000 LSC funded legal services of-
fices in every state, the District of Columbia, Micronesia, Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands. Currently, the Corporation's congressional ap-
propriation is $300 million; a substantial increase from the $88 million
when the Corporation began operations in fiscal year 1976, after hav-
ing been frozen at $71 million for the previous five years.
Although this is phenomenal growth, and it will allow, for the first
time in our country's history, some access to our legal system for every
poor person in every state, it does not provide sufficient resources to
address all the legal needs of all eligible clients in a program's service
area. The $300 million budget for the 1980 fiscal year is only enabling
the Corporation to complete its minimum access funding plan. It
makes possible the provision of the equivalent of two lawyers per every
10,000 poor persons throughout the country.
It is gratifying to be here among so many friends who share the
common concern of how to provide legal representation to those per-
sons who cannot afford an attorney. Many of you have worked long
and hard to provide legal assistance to the under-represented in the
* President, Legal Services Corporation. Presented before the Conference on
Public Interest Practice in Florida; "Practicing Law for Love and Money," Nova Uni-
versity Center for the Study of Law, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., November 16, 1979.
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areas of civil rights, public rights, and/or poverty law.
Today we find that the common thread among all types of public
interest representation is that the partnership of the private bar and the
public lawyer is essential to this endeavor. It is urgent that the private
bar aggressively support, and become more involved in, public interest
practice if we are to live up to our nation's promise of equal justice
under law.
When the Corporation began operations, less than 2 million of our
nation's 29 million poor persons lived in areas with minimum legal ac-
cess. It was not uncommon in certain areas of this country to have one
lawyer per 23,000 poor people. The Corporation is currently engaged
in expansion activities in many parts of the United States to rectify this
situation. However, even with completion of the minimum access plan,
only 15 percent of the indigents' need for civil legal assistance can be
met.
We know that public funds will not be available in the amounts
necessary to completely meet all the legal needs of the poor; therefore,
efforts involving the private bar, like Florida's Public Interest Law
Bank, are going to be essential throughout the country. We commend
this activity and know that there is a great deal of volunteer work be-
ing done in many other locations. The Denver Bar Association oper-
ates a volunteer program involving 1,200 private attorneys. Salaries
and administrative overhead are paid for entirely by the membership
dues of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations. The Hillsborough
County Bar and Bay Area Legal Services program in Tampa, Florida
have an excellent volunteer program. The Chicago Volunteer Lawyers
organization has over 300 private lawyers volunteering services in a
project supported by law firm contributions, foundation and charitable
funding, and by a Chicago Bar Association dues check-off.
In its Delivery Systems Study, which was mandated by Congress
to examine both the staff attorney model and alternative and supple-
mental methods of delivering legal services to the poor, the Corpora-
tion has funded six pro bono demonstration models: the Bar Associa-
tion of San Francisco Volunteer Lawyers Project; the Bet Tzedek
project serving elderly poor in Los Angeles; the Boston Bar Associa-
tion Volunteers Lawyers Project; the New Hampshire Bar Associa-
tion's Citizens Rights Committee Project; Community Law Offices in
New York City; and the Legal Counsel for the Elderly operated by the
National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association
1358 Nova Law Journal 4:980 1
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of Retired Persons in Washington, D.C.
In each of these projects, hundreds of private lawyers are donating
their time to delivering legal services to the poor. For example, the
New Hampshire project, which is a statewide referral system utilizing a
WATS phone system, has 700 out of the 1,000 lawyers in the state,
participating.
In addition to direct client representation, the Corporation is fund-
ing several other demonstration projects, involving the private bar, to
provide training and other support services. In it's Quality Improve-
ment Project, for example, the Corporation is funding a professional
development project in Greenville, South Carolina. The legal services
program will supplement its staff's ability to provide skills training,
and litigation support, to staff attorneys and paralegals through con-
tracts with local private law firms.
The New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, and the Council
of New York Law Associates, are undertaking a LSC funded Quality
Improvement Project that is matching the pro bono services of private
law firms with legal services programs in the areas of management as-
sistance, staff development and specialized expertise. Library and re-
search facilities of private firms, for example, are matched with legal
services offices.
Additionally, the Corporation is working with the Litigation Sec-
tion of the ABA to develop a pilot project in about 20 locations
whereby experienced private litigators will be matched on a one-to-one
basis with legal services lawyers to provide trial advocacy assistance.
The Atlanta Legal Aid Society currently has such an experimental pro-
ject underway and it is finding it very beneficial.
Other methods of involving private lawyers in the delivery of legal
services to the poor are also being examined in the Corporation's De-
livery Systems Study. Contracts with law firms, judicare, prepaid legal
services, and legal clinics are included. The Delivery Systems Study's
main objective is to determine the extent to which delivery models in-
volving the private bar differ from the traditional staff attorney legal
services programs, based on cost, quality, client satisfaction, and im-
pact on the poverty community. The Study is scheduled to be com-
pleted and submitted to the Congress in mid-1980.
To help increase access to our legal system for the average person,
other groups are examining the utilization of alternative methods of
dispute resolution which include small claims court, arbitration and
• !
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mediation, and neighborhood justice centers. However, even with all
this effort involving the private bar and experimentation with other le-
gal remedies, there is need for much more private bar activity if we are
to begin to make equal access to justice a reality for the millions of
poor people who are now being denied justice because they cannot af-
ford an attorney.
There is considerable debate taking place about whether pro bono
work should be mandatory. The New York City Bar, for example, is
discussing a proposal to require each lawyer to provide 40 hours a
year. The California State Bar had a similar proposal that was de-
feated in the state legislature. Bar leaders, like Chesterfield Smith,
have proposed disciplinary sanctions if lawyers do not contribute vol-
unteer services. The discussion draft of the new ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility calls for a contribution of volunteer service annu-
ally by each lawyer to meet his or her Canon 2 public interest
obligation. Also, a self-policing regulations is proposed.
It is gratifying that the American Bar Association has just
launched a major pro bono activation program. Under the sponsorship
of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defend-
ants, and the ABA Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, the
ABA has hired a full-time staff person to work with state and local bar
associations to establish, in cooperation with legal services programs,
viable volunteer projects where none exist and to increase participation
where such projects are underway. The ABA program will provide:
strong centralized leadership at the national level; technical assistance
to develop and implement local pro bono "matching mechanisms" that
will bring needy clients and volunteer lawyers together; and resource
and clearinghouse services to facilitate communication and technical
assistance among bars about new and developing programs and con-
cepts. We hope to work very closely with the American Bar Associa-
tion, as well as with the National Bar Association, the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association, the National Clients Council, legal ser-
vices programs, and other interested groups.
We are close to completion of a compilation of existing pro bono
projects that we hope will serve as a "how to" manual for starting
others. Considerations such as recruiting and retention of private law-
yers, coordination, training of volunteers, and evaluation and quality
control to assure the provision of quality legal services in volunteer
programs are some of the issues that will be examined. Funding, too,
1360 4:980 1
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will be discussed as it also is a major element. With repeated messages
from the Congress and the administration that funding for legal ser-
vices will not be increased in the increments of the past, and that more
reliance must be put on the private bar for support, we must concen-
trate on innovative ways to finance volunteer programs.
The Florida plan to use the interest from client trust funds to
finance such activities is gratifying. In Atlanta, the volunteer program
of the Atlanta Bar Association and'the Atlanta Council of Young
Lawyers that is funded by charging an additional $1.00 filing fee in all
civil actions in the Fulton County State Court, is promising as a proto-
type for the rest of the country.
Our preliminary research for our pro bono manual involved sur-
veying all of our programs to find out what types of pro bono projects
they were undertaking with the private bar. Responses from about 75
programs revealed five basic models: the utilization of private lawyers
to handle case overload; private lawyers who take conflict of interest
cases; private lawyers who take certain categories of cases; private law-
yers who provide training and resource assistance; and rotation plans
whereby private law firms loan lawyers and support staff to a legal
services program for short periods. Added to these, were models utiliz-
ing retired lawyers and preliminary plans for using in-house counsel
and government lawyers. These models were operated by legal services
programs, bar associations and other independent organizations, and
by law firms.
Unfortunately, even though there is encouraging momentum and
many private attorneys are already doing their share to meet the legal
needs of the poor in their communities, and despite the fact that there
has been a history of strong national leadership supporting this kind of
activity, there is resistance by significant numbers of private lawyers
and even opposition to such legal services by some segments of the
private bar. We are finding, in connection with the Corporation's ex-
pansion activities, that in certain areas of the country where there has
never been publicly-funded legal services, the same opposition exists
that was prevalent when the publicly-funded movement began in the
mid-sixties.
Of course, for the most part, providing legal services to the poor is
accepted. However, we need to renew the dedication and the commit-
ment of the private bar and public officials to the concept that equal
justice under law is more than just words that appear on the facade of
361 1
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the United States Supreme Court. It is a right that belongs to everyone
regardless of race, religion, or economic circumstance. We also need to
stimulate the concern about public interest law that was present in the
sixties and early seventies. We are at a crossroad as we enter the
1980's; we have seen the pendulum swing from the aggressive private
bar activities undertaken to help pass the Public Accommodations Act,
the Civil Rights Act, the creation of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, and the establishment of the poverty law move-
ment, to a more complacent, comfortable posture.
It is my strong feeling that we cannot let his happen while millions
of people in this country still have no place to turn for legal assistance.
It is time for all of us to join together to make the ideal of equal justice
under law a reality. The private bar and the public lawyer are an essen-
tial partnership if we are to achieve this. It is vital that we build that
partnership. I ask your support and counsel.
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Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some
New Ways of Looking at an Old Question
ALAN MORRISON*
It is my thesis today that we need to reexamine the definition of what
constitutes the practice of law. The traditional inquiry into what activ-
ities constitute the unauthorized practice of law is largely, if not whol-
ly, misguided. What is needed is a whole new mode of analysis. Be-
cause we are asking the wrong questions, we are getting answers
unacceptable to the way our society operates today.
However, before asking about the unauthorized practice of law,
we ought to look into the "authorized" practice of law, commonly
known as bar admissions. Why do we have bar admissions? What are
we trying to protect? First, we are worried about competence; second,
about integrity; and third about the loyalty to the client. Those are the
generally perceived components of bar admissions.
For the first component we have examinations and educational ex-
perience requirements. For the second we have character investigations.
And third, we have an ongoing Code of Professional Responsibility by
which lawyers are supposed to guide their actions. The purpose of all
of these is to protect the public, not to enable lawyers to protect them-
selves from competition. This protection of the public is, I think we
have to acknowledge, a form of paternalism. We are saying to the pub-
lic that the cost of having a lawyer is not a relevant consideration. For
those areas which we say are exclusively the province of the lawyer, no
matter how significant the cost may be, you the public have to have a
lawyer if you are going to have someone help you at all.
Are there any limits to what the courts have said about how to
stately define the practise of law? In the United States Supreme Court
case of Ferguson v. Scrupa,' the Supreme Court said that state deter-
* Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C. Presented before
the Conference on Public Interest Practice in Florida; "Practicing Law for Love and
Money," Nova University Center for the Study of Law, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Nov-
ember 16, 1979. All rights reserved to Mr. Morrison.
1. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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minations on these matters are not subject to attack under the due pro-
cess clause. While that ruling antedates many of the recent first amend-
ment cases under which advertising restrictions were successfully struck
down, it seems to me that the first amendment attack on the practice
of law will not be a successful one.
A few years ago the Supreme Court in the Feretta2 case said that
in the area of criminal law, any person has a constitutional right to
defend himself. But the courts have consistently held that a defendant
does not have a constitutional right to have someone other than a law-
yer defend him/her. 3
One of the few cases in which the Supreme Court or any other
court has held unauthorized practice to be unconstitutional is Johnson
v. A very.4 In that decision the Court ruled that prison authorities could
not discipline inmates for acting as writ writers where there were no
other facilities available, and where there were no lawyers readily avail-
able to handle their grievances. Other than in that narrow area there
have been very few successful attacks. The only other one of which I
am aware is Sperry v. Florida,' in which the Supreme Court ruled that
where the United States Patent Office, pursuant to a congressional
statute, ruled that persons other than lawyers may prepare patent ap-
plications, the state of Florida could not, because of the doctrine of
federal preemption, exclude that kind of activity under the guise of reg-
ulating the unauthorized practice of law. There have also been a few
other rulings in the area, where the Internal Revenue authorities have
established similar kinds of authorization. But other than those isolated
situations, whatever a state does through its courts or its legislature is,
by and large, immune from constitutional attack.
There is one other federal challenge to the unauthorized practice
of law rules under the anti-trust laws. In Surety Title Insurance
Agency v. Virginia State Bar' the district court ruled that the bar itself,
as opposed to a court, cannot define or attempt to define what consti-
tutes the practice of law. Although this decision was reversed on other
2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
3. See e.g. U.S. v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976).
4. 395 U.S. 483 (1969).
5. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
6. 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 98 S.Ct. 2838 (1978).
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grounds, it is generally conceived to have a sound analytical frame-
work. The court said that kind of activity would be an attempt to mo-
nopolize and a group boycott, especially in light of the bar's inclination
to define the practice of law as broadly as possible to prevent
competition.
There is perhaps one other application of the anti-trust laws which
has not been brought but which I suppose some day the Justice Depart-
ment will get around to bringing, and that is to the so called principals
which the American Bar Association has entered into with various
other professions such as the title insurance companies, banks, trust
companies, and so forth. I like to refer to those as territorial truces in
which the various professions have divided up the world and decided
who can compete with whom in what area. It seems to me that if any-
one got around to looking at those agreements they would probably be
viewed as horizontal territorial divisions, and hence in violation of the
anti-trust laws. We in the District of Columbia have abrogated those
principal agreements on the grounds that we didn't want to subject
ourselves to any liability. I don't know if those agreements are still
being enforced elsewhere, but they continue to remain. Nonetheless the
bottom line is that states are by and large free to decide what consti-
tutes the practice of law, at least as far as federal law is concerned.
I want to emphasize, however, that even in the few cases in which
unauthorized practice rules have been stricken, the courts have not said
that lawyers may not engage in those activities under review. The only
thing they have said is that you can't keep others from engaging in
such activities. For example, no one would contend that writing a fire
code is a matter which only lawyers can do. On the other hand, no one
would suggest that lawyers ought to be excluded from those allowed to
write such codes. The real question before us is the question of exclu-
sivity. That is, what belongs to the lawyers and only to the lawyers, or
how has the practice of law been defined?
One definition is that the practice of law is anything usually done
by lawyers. As Chesterfield Smith once said to me, "The practice of
law is anything my client will pay me to do." I suppose that in my
case, that would include riding on airplanes, sitting in court, doing my
own filing, my own xeroxing, things that Chesterfield probably doesn't
have to do in his practice, but which we have to do in ours. But even
that is, of course, a little broad. Somebody has said, "it is anything
that lawyers and only lawyers usually do." I don't think you have to be
r T
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very astute to see the question begging nature of that kind of definition.
It does, however, seem to me that the cases and the definitions such as
they are, have broken down into three separate areas. I intend to look
at each area; representation in court, drafting of legal documents, and
giving legal advice; and see when the questions asked make sense and
when they don't.
Perhaps the classic example of lawyer's work is representing
someone in a courtroom because that is how the public perceives the
lawyer. Yet there are many exceptions to this. The most common, of
course, is the right of pro se representation, which is, by and large,
guaranteed by the constitutions of most states. In the few states where
it is not guaranteed by constitution, it has grown up in practice without
recent challenge. However, this right doesn't apply if you happen to be
a corporation. Corporations are not generally entitled to pro se repre-
sentation. Attempted equal protection challenges to this rule have usu-
ally failed. The courts have almost universally said that a corporation
is different from an individual. While there is general concurrence with
this distinction, no one quite agrees why that should make any differ-
ence in this particular context. And when we are dealing with corpora-
tions that are little more than legal fictions under which mom and pop
run their grocery store, one wonders why they should not be entitled to
represent themselves in court.
The Virginia State Bar went so far as to attempt to say that cor-
porations could not even use their own house counsel to represent them
in court because that would violate the rule on corporate representa-
tion. They have since backed down on that, even as a proposal. More-
over the Virginia rules changed in response to the Surety Title case I
mentioned earlier, and now the Virginia bar can no longer issue nega-
tive opinions as to what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law;
that is, they cannot prohibit questionable activities pending approval by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. They have to go through fairly compli-
cated procedures to get to the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the
procedures have been in effect for about a year and a half now and
they haven't got the first set of opinions up to the Supreme Court yet.
I'm not so sure that the Supreme Court of Virginia is going to like the
idea of having to review all these opinions when they come up, but that
is quite another matter.
In any event, these equal protection claims on behalf of corpora-
tions, have not succeeded thus far. There is one small ray of hope, at
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least where the corporations are non-profit organizations that are, like
the American Civil Liberties Union-or like our organization, exercising
their first amendment associational rights. We believe in this area the
unauthorized practice of law rules may run afoul, not of the equal pro-
tection clause so much, as the First Amendment freedom of association
clause.
Beyond courtroom representation, there are a series of cases in-
volving representation in administrative agency proceedings. Courts
took the traditional view that litigation is litigation whether you are in
the courthouse or before an administrative agency. The cases first
arose in the area of workmen's compensation, and I think it is not
unfair to suggest that many of the motives of the bar were pecuniary
rather than protective in nature. Lawyers saw that they were losing
business to lay persons who were representing workers in compensation
cases and they didn't like it. I might also say that the courts didn't
much like it either. They said that it is irrelevant that the legislature
tried to get these cases out of court. The locus of the service, said the
court in one case, is irrelevant. I suggest that that kind of response is
irrelevant too and that the question ought to be whether having a law-
yer is necessary for the protection of the public; and I remain uncon-
vinced that it is.
Now, however, I think that the cases and practices are more ac-
cepting that lay persons can represent others before administrative
agencies, in the labor area in arbitrations, and in the governmental em-
ployee area in connection with grievances. Many contracts, indeed
some statutes, specifically provide for representation by persons who
are not lawyers. Furthermore, when the lay person is appearing on be-
half of a non-profit association, the constitutional arguments I men-
tioned earlier are even stronger in the context of an administrative
agency, particularly where the proceeding is more legislative than judi-
cial in both of functions and format.
The last area where representation is often pressed by lawyers is
the legislative area. Yet no authority of which I am aware says that
because you are "representing" a client of one kind or another before a
legislative body, you must be a member of the bar. Indeed, the oppo-
site is usually the case. Ironically, the legislative representation may be
far more important to the client than any court case that will ever
arise, and yet it is perfectly all right for non-lawyers to provide such
representation.
367 1
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Speaking of the term, "non-lawyer," every time I use it I ask my-
self about it. If you go home at night and find your house full of water,
you call a plumber. But if you wanted to call somebody else who is not
a plumber, would you ever refer to him or her as a non-plumber? Or
would you refer to someone else as a non-doctor, or a non-dentist? The
only people who manage to divide the world into their profession and
everbody else's by putting a "non" in front of them, are lawyers. So I
will try, although I don't know that I can succeed, not to use that term
here today.
The rationale behind these representation exclusions extends be-
yond the protection of the client. It is said that we need to insure that
lawyers are doing the representing because that's the way to assure that
we have orderly and speedy proceedings and thereby protect the inde-
pendent interests of the courts. I suggest to you that that reasoning, if
not wholly specious, is at least vastly overrated. In my view, we ought
to start with the premise that the courts exist for the benefit of the
people and not vice versa. Only if we can show that allowing persons
other than lawyers to represent clients in court would, in fact, impede
significantly the interest of other litigants, should we say that the inter-
ests of the courts are important. Since we already allow pro se repre-
sentation, the question to be asked is, "will it be any worse if we allow
persons who may be knowledgeable, although not trained as lawyers,
to help out people who are pro se?" As far as I know, there has been
no showing anyplace that allowing friends to come in and help out per-
sons in courtroom proceedings is going to produce any sort of signifi-
cant delay. I should think that those who are urging this proposition
ought to have the burden of showing that that kind of delay will occur.
A second point about lay representation is that these cases, by and
large, are simple cases. We're not talking about patent litigation, con-
struction litigation, anti-trust suits, or securities fraud cases. We are
talking about very simple cases which don't usually require the skills of
a lawyer. We aren't talking about situations with complex motions, a
plethora of discovery, and detailed procedural maneuvering. To say
that lay persons can't conduct anti-trust class action litigation, doesn't
answer the question of whether, in most of the cases we are talking
about, it makes any sense to say that lay persons cannot be of
assistance.
Finally, if we are really concerned about insuring that the client is
making a rational choice in being represented by a lay person, the
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judge can say to the client, "Do you understand that you have the right
to a lawyer? Whether you can afford one or not is a matter for you to
determine, but you should know that this person is not an attorney."
The judge can say, in a neutral setting, "Think about it." But despite
this alternative for dealing with lay assistance, the courts have simply
looked the other way.
The consequence of all this is, in general, twofold. Either the case
is not brought at all because the pergon is simply frightened of the
courts and won't go in by himself, or he brings the case and loses. Of
corse, lay representation won't guarantee a different result, but it may
help.
In realistic terms the option is not whether it is desirable to hire
an attorney, because most people recognize that in most situations law-
yers will provide better representation. The problem is they simply
can't afford one. It is rather like the familiar famous saying of Anatole
France: "the rich and poor alike are equally forbidden to sleep under
the bridges of Paris." That's the problem here.
I don't mean to suggest that the courts and other litigants don't
have an interest in seeing that the procedures are orderly and con-
ducted in a fair matter. My point is that this interest is often vastly
overstated. What is needed is a re-evaluation of the rules regarding lay
representation, particularly at the administrative level, where the theo-
retical goal is to provide a speedy, inexpensive remedy. It simply
makes no sense to impose a requirement adding lawyers who will be
neither inexpensive nor speedy.
The second general area in which the practice of law has been held
to be exclusive is the preparation of legal documents, such as wills,
trusts, deeds and merger agreements. The line seems to be drawn, not
at drafting of model or sample documents, but at particularization;
that is, trying to draft a particular document for a particular situation.
The problem with this analysis is that it proves too much. Because eve-
rything we do has legal consequences, every document can be seen as a
legal document with legal significance and effects. When you file a
credit card application, certain rights are established and waived. Hos-
pital admission forms typically purport to establish legal rights and
remedies. When a tenant writes a landlord about repairs, it is a docu-
ment with legal significance. Acceptance of a check from an insurance
company by signing it may constitute a waiver of all kinds of rights
that you thought you had. The result is that the lines on legal docu-
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ments have been drawn in irrational ways.
For those of you who are either home owners or in the real estate
business, you know that the single key document in the purchase of a
house is the contract to buy. Yet virtually every state allows that docu-
ment to be prepared by a real estate broker, or by anybody else. Yet
the deed to the property, about which you may be able to do almost
nothing because you've lost or waived all your rights in the contract,
can only be drawn by a lawyer. Similarly, insurance companies or in-
dependent agents prepare the most complicated contracts with all kinds
of waivers on this and that. But when it comes to filling in a release
form to settle a two hundred dollar automobile accident claim, there
are cases which have held that only a lawyer can prepare that docu-
ment because its much too important to be left in the hands of mere
laymen.
Now, in part, this pattern is a concession to the shortness of life.
Contrary to popular assumption, lawyers are not ubiquitous, or if they
are, the average citizen can't afford to have one looking over his or her
shoulder everytime they sign a piece of paper. It is not bad that law-
yers are not involved in all these situations. The problem is that the
lines are not drawn on the grounds of complexities, as evidenced by the
deed which an attorney (or a secretary) must do even if it means simp-
ly filling in the blanks. To say that that kind of work must come from
a lawyer's office, as opposed to a bank, a title insurance office, or a
real estate broker's office, simply doesn't make any sense.
The cases have taken another approach in response to this prob-
lem: if the drawing of the legal document is incidental to another line
of business, then it will be permitted. Therefore, the real estate broker
can draw the contract for the house, in part because that's the way he
is going to get his fee, and the title insurance company is sometimes
allowed to draw some of the settlement documents because that's what
the title company is insuring against, and it wants to be sure they are
drawn properly.
Yet, these cases, as I see them, seem to constitute little more than
a rationalization for territorial truces between the warring professions.
One can hardly discern any sensible pattern in them, particularly in
terms of the complexity of the work undertaken or the risk involved.
Indeed in most of these cases, we have situations in which complexities
seem to be the opposing factor rather than the supporting factor; par-
ticularly when deciding whether a title company can do something or a
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real estate broker can do something, both of whom are, by and large,
knowledgeable in the area.
Now, once again, I don't contend that there are not some docu-
ments which should be drawn only by attorneys. What I am saying is
that the way we decide which ones are solely the province of lawyers is,
in a phrase, intellectually bankrupt.
In a wonderful case in the Virginia Supreme Court in 1947, Com-
monwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc.,7 Chief Judge Holt, in his dissent to
an opinion which said that only lawyers can prepare deeds, quoted
Humpty Dumpty in Alice In Wonderland and said "anything I say it
is, it is." He then went on to observe that, no matter how hard the
Supreme Court tried to make it so, to shuck corn is not to practice
law. I don't know if we have any opinions in which the shucking of
corn has been held to be the practice of law, but we are coming close.
And I suggest to you that the time is now to start looking realistically,
and not legalistically, at the question of who may draft what kinds of
documents.
Now then, let me turn to the third area: the giving of legal advice.
Before I do that, let me raise another question, which arises most fre-
quently in this part of the definition of the practice of law. Do you have
to be paid for what you have done in order to be guilty of the unautho-
rized practice of law? While the element of compensation is present in
most other areas, it is most prominent in the giving of legal advice.
Compensation alone is not enough to trigger guilt, as the selling of
legal forms in the five and dime store demonstrates. Of course, there is
an old adage that there is no such thing as a free lunch and that is true
in the giving of legal advice. Yet, if compensation is an element, it is
often very hard to prove and would pose inordinate burdens in many
cases. For this reason, in most jurisdictions, the fact that compensation
is given or not given is legally irrelevant. It obviates problems of proof,
and, I must confess, it is consistent with the notion that we are protect-
ing the person from getting bad advice, not saving the profession from
competition.
Yet I have an uneasy feeling that there is an element of overkill
here. What the rules of unauthorized practice of law are primarily try-
ing to prohibit is the charlatan who is preying upon innocent people,
not the neighbor who simply wants to give you some friendly advice.
7 186 Va. 30. 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).
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The compensation problem seems to me to be further proof of the irra-
tional rigidity of the present rules.
Returning to the question of what is legal advice, one finds that it
is rather like the question of what is a legal document. It's too broad.
So the question has been refined somewhat. Legal advice is advice as to
the legal consequences of a course of action on which the recipient re-
lies to determine his or her course of conduct. Now I suppose one
could say that when law professors, or perhaps bar review teachers, are
giving advice as to what constitutes the law, they are giving legal ad-
vice too. But no one has suggested that to be a law professor you have
to be admitted to the bar of your state. Indeed, I know one esteemed
law school in which there are members of the faculty who are not ad-
mitted to practice anyplace, even though they are graduate lawyers.
And there are some members of the faculty who aren't even law school
graduates. So, the general giving of opinions on the state of the law is
not sufficient.
What has been deemed unauthorized practice has been giving par-
ticular advice about particular legal consequence. To test that ap-
proach, let's pose a problem. I am driving down the highway doing 55
mph and there's a large truck in front of me doing 54 mph. I'm riding
with my wife, and she says to me, "Pass that truck." I say to her "I
can't, I am now at the legal speed limit." She says to me "Oh yes you
can. You may exceed the speed limit to pass the truck as long as you
resume the speed limit once you have passed the truck and gone back
into your lane." Is she practicing law? After all, she has given me par-
ticularlized advice as to the legal consequences of a transaction on
which I am relying to determine my conduct and for which I may go to
jail or lose my driver's license if she is wrong.
Or take a comparable situation in the medical area. I go home at
Thanksgiving to visit my parents and my Aunt Gertrude is there. I feel
just rotten. My Aunt Gertrude says to me, "What you need to do is to
go to bed and take lots of fruit juice and aspirin, and sleep it off." If
my doctor would tell me exactly the same thing, does that mean my
Aunt Gertrude is practicing medicine without a license? And is that
any different from my wife practicing law without a license in the other
case, and if so, why?
Take a look at the tax area, and I don't mean simply filling in
income tax returns. I'm talking about tax advice and planning. Ac-
countants give tax advice. Life insurance agents give tax advice. Stock
1372
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brokers advise you on the tax ramifications of transactions. Your
banker may tell you the tax consequences of certain transactions.
Surely, the vast industry of pension advisers is giving lots of tax advice.
What they are telling you is, if you do it this way you get the benefits
of the law, and if you do it that way, you don't get the benefits. Are
these people practicing law without a license? Well, maybe yes and
maybe no.
Take the Rosemary Furman8 case, for instance. Leaving aside the
question of whether Ms. Furman, in typing divorce papers, was prepar-
ing legal documents, let's just take the easier situation before she types
anything where people come into her office, and say to her, "I would
like a dissolution of my marriage." The first question she asks, and the
first question on the form she now uses is, "How long have you been a
resident of Florida." Now, does she give a legal opinion when she de-
cides what constitutes residence and is that the same as domicile? Is
she giving legal advice when she tells someone she or he may or may
not get a divorce at that time?
I suggest to you that when we're trying to ask questions about
what constitutes legal advice under these circumstances, we cannot
come up with any sensible answers. We tried, in Ms. Furman's case, to
get the court to back off a little bit from where it had come from in the
past. We made a constitutional argument which, both in the original
brief, and on rehearing, the court decided by refusing to respond at all.
We argued that for indigents and others who cannot afford lawyers, for
a dissolution of marriage which is a state controlled monopoly, the de-
cisions in Boddie v Connecticut' (saying you can't require filing fees for
divorces), and Johnson v. A very'" (the prisoner unauthorized practice
case), do not permit a state to require an unaffordable lawyer instead
of an affordable legal secretary. In our view the state can no more
preclude Rosemary Furman and others from providing that legal assis-
tance than it can preclude prisoners from providing writ writing assis-
tance to their inmates. We lost that case, and we are now going to take
it on to the Supreme Court."
Last, let me suggest one other area where legal advice is given all
8. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1979).
9. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
11. On Feb. 19, 1980, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
• !
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the time. Ann Landers has a column. Undoubtedly you have seen it.
She probably practices medicine but on this occasion she was in the
legal business. She received a letter in which the writer said "My hus-
band and I fly around together a lot on airplanes. We don't have a will.
We got to thinking the other day when we got in the middle of a bad
windstorm, what would happen if the plane went down and we were
both killed? Are the godparents of our child legally responsible for
bringing her up? And if they aren't, what would happen?" Ann Landers
replied "No, the godparents are not legally responsible. If you die in-
testate, the child will probably be brought up by relatives. But you
ought to have a will." Is she giving legal advice? She has certainly told
people what she thinks the law is. Is she practicing law without a li-
cense? And if so, in what jurisdiction? Well, the problem lies not with
the answers but with the questions. What we need are new questions
that relate to the reasons that we license attorneys in the first place.
Consider the electrician who comes to your home. Do we require
an electrician to change a light bulb? No. Do we require an electrician
to do the somewhat more complicated operation of changing a fuse?
No. How about if you want to put a new fixture in your dining room?
Do we require an electrician to do that? No. How about if you want to
rewire your house? The answer is, in most cases, that you cannot do it
yourself. The state says that's against the law. No matter how much
you want to, you cannot do it, and that rule plainly overrides your free
choice and your economic considerations. It overrides it because there
is an implicit judgment in it, that the risks of harm, in terms of a
major fire, are so great, and the likelihood of success by most lay per-
sons is so small, that cost and free choice are simply no longer
relevant.
Take my Aunt Gertrude agai If instead of prescribing rest,
chicken soup, aspirin and fruit juice, she said, "What you need is open
heart surgery performed by me." We would all recoil because the like-
lihood of her succeeding is so small and the risk of harm to me is so
great, that my free choice in that case, even if I consented before every-
one in the world, is irrelevant. The state would say no, Aunt Gertrude
may not perform that operation on me.
Now even these questions, of course, eliminate the important ele-
ment of cost. Cost is related to, but in a way different from, questions
of free choice. For instance, driving across the country, you are surely
more likely to arrive safely in a 1979 Rolls Royce than you would in a
Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
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1940 Studebaker. Yet no one has suggested that everyone has to have a
Rolls Royce to drive across country. Even if lawyers are the equivalent
of Rolls Royces (and I think most people think they are more
equivalent to Studebakers), there are some situations in which society
should let people drive Studebakers. In my view, an individual should
be able to choose secretaries, real estate brokers, accountants or
whatever, instead of having to use lawyers, unless there is a very good
reason why free choice and added cost must be imposed for the protec-
tion of the individual.
This question of when to limit free choice and when to impose
additional cost on individuals is, I think, a rather subjective question.
It involves a policy orientated question that is very heavily value laden.
It is not the kind of question which courts normally address by apply-
ing the law to the facts, and it surely is not a legal question in the sense
of interpreting the meaning of a statute, contract or other document. It
is the type of judgment which is typically made by legislatures and not
by courts. Leaving aside the question of whether the legislature in a
particular state has the power to change the rules defining the practice
of law, I suggest to you that the judgment is much more legislative
than judicial in nature. In fact, the legislatures do this kind of judging
in a number of areas involving the legal profession, but it generally has
been to add to those areas which are the exclusive province of the law-
yer. The problem, of course, is that the legislature cannot, or will not,
look at these problems on a unified and widespread basis.
What is needed, I suggest, is a quasi legislative agency, and in
fact, the courts may now be acting as such. I think this is what the
Supreme Court of Florida did in the Brumbaugh" case when it drew
the lines in the area of assisting persons seeking to attain dissolution of
marriage in the form of allowing written but not oral communications
between clients and secretaries trying to help them.
The problem is that these issues are arising with increasing fre-
quency and are imposing great burdens upon the courts. Judges are by
and large not selected because they are representative of broad spec-
trums of interest, or because they are trained or otherwise qualified to
make policy judgments. The courts are, moreover, not set up to issue
rules that have wide ranging effects, in part because there is little public
input into the process. Indeed, in the Brumbaugh case the Florida Bar
12. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (1978).
• I
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never had an opportunity to really address the issue, because Ms.
Brumbaugh was appearing pro se and yet, in that very narrow context,
the court issued an extremely broad rule that effected virtually every-
body in Florida.
As I indicated earlier, the bar plainly cannot take on this task
because of its own conflicts of interest and economic self-interest in the
area. What we need, I suggest, is a new body, established by the legis-
lature, which has as its component parts three separate institutional
interests. One is the interest of the bar, which has a major role to play;
second, is the interest of consumers of legal services, who have a very
important say in the matter; and third, is a group that I broadly refer
to as competitors-title insurance companies, real estate brokers, ac-
countants-who would be performing alternative services, if allowed, in
competition with services offered by the bar. This mini-legislature
would, I suggest, be able to take into account all of the relevant fac-
tors, and to issue rules which would ultimately be subject to judicial
review. It would be directed to balance the competing interests under a
general standard that would call for a balancing of the risk of harm
and the likelihood of success on the one hand, against the right of free
choice and the added cost on the other. This question is ultimately a
practical or policy question, not a "legal" one that the courts are read-
ily able to handle. Moreover, what is needed is flexibility and not rigid-
ity, a further reason for taking this function away from courts who rely
so heavily on precedent.
On first thought the answers to the questions in particular cases
will not be easy. They will not be automatic simply because we are
asking the right questions of an appropriate constitutional body. On
the other hand, we will never come up with sensible answers, until at
least we start asking sensible questions.
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A Federal Litigation Program: For Students, Inmates
and the Legal Profession
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, efforts have been made by the federal judiciary, the
American Bar Association, and law schools to improve the quality of
advocacy in the federal courts. One of the proposed measures would
require a special examination for admission to the bar,' but another
bar exam alone will not create competent attorneys. The development
of quality advocates should begin in the law schools. The traditional
Langdellian' case study method has been under attack for several
years.3 Recent institutions of clinical programs point out the transition
taking place in the law school curricula. Emphasis has been placed on
practical experience in an effort to develop and refine advocacy skills.
Although advocacy programs on the state court level are widespread,
programs in the federal courts are still in the early stages of develop-
ment. In keeping with current educational philosophies,' Nova Univer-
1. REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE TO CON-
SIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES Sept. 21, 22, 1978 at 10, 11. [hereinafter
cited as RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE (1978)].
2. Christopher Columbus Langdell, as Dean of Harvard University Law School,
introduced the case study method of instruction in 1870. Prior to that time, students
served as apprentices to experienced attorneys and studied comprehensive treatises set-
ting forth substantive law. Gee and Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and
Lawyer Competency, 4 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 695, 722-726, 733-734 (1977)[hereinafter cited
as Gee and Jackson.]
3. "The case method has been criticized almost from the start but the criticism
generally relates not to what it is, but to what it omits." Grossman, Clinical Legal
Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 165 (1974). For a good
discussion of the criticism of the case method see: Berryhill, Clinical Education - A
Gold Dancer? 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 69 (1978).
4. "Indeed, it can be asserted that the single most significant event to occur in
legal education during the 1970's has been the growth and development of clinical legal
education programs in this country." The Survey and Directory of Clinical Legal Edu-
cation, Council on Professional Responsibility in Legal Education (June 1, 1979) at ii
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sity Center for the Study of Law recently participated in an experimen-
tal federal litigation program in the Southern District of Florida. The
program involved seven students who litigated a civil rights suit filed
pro se5 by an inmate.
The first section of this paper discusses the ways a federal litiga-
tion program could fulfill the obligations of the legal profession: first,
by enhancing the quality of advocacy through student practice; second,
by responding to the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity; and third, by providing legal services to prisoners. The second sec-
tion of this article, proposes a model for a federal litigation program.
The focus is on course requirements, supervision, funding and imple-
mentation. In the final section, the writers relate details of their partici-
pation in a federal civil rights suit and thereby seek to demonstrate
that a program can be designed to offer students experience in federal
court litigation.
II. WHY A FEDERAL COURT LITIGATION
PROGRAM IS NEEDED
A. The Need to Improve the Quality of Advocacy
Perhaps the most vexing issue facing the legal profession today is
the competency of trial attorneys. This issue prompted the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States, Warren E. Burger, to say, "No single pro-
ject, no program, no enterprise of the legal profession or the ABA is of
greater importance or will be of longer-lasting value than to proceed
promptly to remedy the incompetency problem."'
First hand experience with defense attorneys has caused a very
able trial judge to "describe some of the counsel coming before the
courts as 'walking violations of the Sixth Amendment.' '" The Chief
Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, David L. Bazelon, gave the following examples of these "walk-
ing violations" which he saw every week:
citing Gee and Jackson at 881.
5. "For himself in his own behalf, in person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099
(5th ed. 1979).
6. Address by Chief Justice Burger, ABA Midyear Meeting (1977).
7. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Council, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
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Defense counsel did not know that the court kept records of prior con-
victions; Defense counsel advised the judge that he could take only a few
minutes for summation because he had to move his car by five o'clock;
Defense counsel invited the jury to draw an inference from the fact that
there were no witnesses to corroborate his client's alibi defense;
Defense counsel told the jury he had done the best job he could "with
what I have had to work with;" Defense counsel based his case o-n an
1895 decision; when the judge asked for a later precedent, the attor-
ney said that he couldn't find a Shepard's citator.'
A major step towards alleviating the incompetency problem began
in September of 1976. Chief Justice Warren Burger, acting in his ca-
pacity as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
created the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal
Courts.' Chief Judge Edward J. Devitt of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota was appointed chairman. 0 Judge
Devitt created a Subcommittee on Procedures and Methods chaired by
Judge James Lawrence King." The subcommittee requested that the
Federal Judicial Center undertake research into the quality of advo-
cacy in the federal courts." Questionnaires were sent out to all district
judges in the spring of 1977.1 The first question asked was, "Do you
believe that there is, overall, a serious problem of inadequate trial ad-
vocacy by lawyers with cases in your court?"" Of the three hundred
sixty six judges who expressed an opinion in response to this question,
forty one percent stated that they believed there is a serious problem."'
8. Id. at 2-3.
9. THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, A REPORT TO THE
COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER
STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1978) at xiii
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (1978).1
10. Id. at xiii. The committee is commonly referred to as the Devitt Committee.
Id. at xiv.
11. Id. at xiii.
12. Id.
13. The purpose behind the questionnaire was to elicit opinions from the judges
about the quality of advocacy in their courts. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 14.
15. The study was based on 1,969 performances by attorneys who appeared in
379[1
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The study also provided information depicted in graphic form which
outlined the relation between the trial performance rating and the num-
ber of district court trials conducted by the attorney in the last ten
years. The results showed that lawyers who had between zero to two
cases were rated as inadequate in thirty percent of the trials and no
better than adequate in twenty-five percent." This graph seems to indi-
cate, as one might expect, that there is a direct correlation between
trial litigation experience and competency. 7 It should come as no sur-
prise to members of the legal profession that practical experience is
necessary to acquire competency in trial skills just as it is in all other
areas of endeavor such as medicine, sports, or the arts.
The survey also attempted to discern which areas of advocacy
skills needed the most improvement. The conclusions of the judges who
responded was that the greatest need arises in the area of "planning
and management of litigation."' 8 In addition, the most needed areas of
improvement in legal knowledge were in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and in Federal Rules of Procedure." The conclusions of this study indi-
cated a need to improve the quality of advocacy in the United States
District Courts which can best be achieved by "assuring minimum uni-
848 trials before district court judges. It should be noted, that 89 judges did not re-
spond to the questionnaire, 2 said they had no opinion, and 19 responded to the ques-
tionnaire but not to this particular question. Id. at 13, 15.
16. The statistics revealed that the 30 per cent rate for inadequate performance
dropped dramatically to 12.9 per cent for those attorneys who had practical experience
in just 3-5 trials. Id. at 42.
17. The attorneys who appeared in 31 or more cases were found to be inadequate
in 8.9 per cent of their performances. Moreover, 24.4 per cent of their performances
were found to be first rate and 35.6 per cent were rated as very good. By contrast, of
those attorneys who conducted between 0-2 trials, 5 per cent were found to be first rate
and 20 per cent were considered very good. Id. at 42.
18. Id. at 46.
Planning and management of litigation included skill and judgment in:
a. Developing a strategy for the conduct of a case.
b. Recognizing and reacting to critical issues as they arise.
c. The use of discovery.
d. The use of pretrial conferences.
e. Handling settlement negotiations, including judgment as to when a settle-
ment (or plea agreement) is appropriate.
Id. at 45.
19. Id. at 51.
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form national standards of competency for admission to practice. ' ' 0
The Devitt Committee recommended that admission to the Federal
Trial Bar be conditioned on good standing in the state court and: 1)
successful completion of an examination on federal practice and proce-
dure and 2) four trial experiences as an associate or under the supervi-
sion of a bar member.2' The committee's recommendations have been
met with some opposition, however, and adoption is not certain. 2
In an attempt to improve the training and competence of law stu-
dents, the Devitt Committee also called for the adoption of a Model
Rule for Student Practice before the federal courts." An investigation
of various student practice programs found that when well planned,
organized, and supervised, they are highly useful "in the delivery of
legal services and as vehicles for training trial advocates. 124 Recently
compiled statistics bear out the necessity for the adoption of a rule for
student practice in federal courts. The Law School Admission Council
of Princeton, New Jersey sent questionnaires to four thousand gradu-
ates of six law schools and received one thousand six hundred an-
swers. 25 Of the forty-seven and four-tenths percent who work in trial
and litigation, nearly one in five (nineteen and six-tenths percent) said
20. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE (1978) at 8, 9.
21. SUPPLEMENT A, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REMEDIES TO THE COM-
MITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER STAN-
DARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS. Aug. 1978 at 1. [herein-
after cited as SUBCOMMITTEE ON REMEDIES (1978)]. The committee recommended that
at least two of these trials involve actual participation by the individual seeking admis-
sion to the federal bar. The committee also recommended that the examination not be
required of persons admitted to the bar before the effective date of the new rules.
22. See, e.g., Otorowski, Some Fundamental Problems with the Devitt Commit-
tee Report, 65 A.B.A.J. 713 (1979).
23. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE (1978) at 25. The Model Rule was
drafted by the Subcommittee on Rules for Limited Admission to Practice of Law Stu-
dents, a subcommittee of the Devitt Committee. The full committee then recom-
mended the adoption of the Rule by the District Courts in its report to the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Id. at 24. It should also be noted, that the subcom-
mittee recommended that student practice in trials should count toward the four trial
experiences requirement. SUBCOMMITTEE ON REMEDIES (1978) at 34.
24. SUBCOMMITTEE ON REMEDIES (1978) at 46.
25. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Gradu-
ates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264, 267. The six law schools surveyed were: Boston College,
George Washington, Michigan, New York University, San Francisco, and Texas. Id.
at 267.
• !
14:1980 381 1
1
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss2/1
I 382 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
their training was not useful." The survey reported that forty-four per-
cent of the attorneys believed their law school education had not helped
in their ability to draft legal documents; seventy-seven and one-half
percent said that their training had not helped them in their ability to
interview witnesses; fifty-seven and nine-tenths percent said their
courses failed to aid them to investigate facts, and sixty-eight and six-
tenths percent said that they had not been adequately trained to coun-
sel clientsY
The dichotomy between the academic approach to the study of
law and its effect on those students who become trial litigators must be
bridged if the goal of improving the quality of trial advocacy is to be
met. Therefore, the time has come to reform law school education so
that it will conform to the changing needs of society. One suggestion
made by Chief Justice Burger is that the third year of law school be
expanded to a full twelve month program comparable to a medical in-
ternship.28 The Chief Justice, drawing from the medical profession, jus-
tified the need for such a program saying:
Just as hospitals almost universally do not allow a first year medical
student graduate to perform surgery without some demonstration of
skill, why should we allow a first year law school graduate to represent a
client in court when that client has significant rights and property at
stake?2
There is a growing concensus among members of the federal judi-
ciary that law school education must be improved. This is evidenced by
the recent call of the United States Judicial Conference endorsing a
plan "aimed at pressuring the nation's law schools into placing more
emphasis on teaching trial skills."30 Law school internship programs
could provide a useful forum in which trial skills might be built. In
addition to developing more competent trial attorneys, these programs
could also help fulfill the legal profession's obligation to provide assis-
26. Id. at 270.
27. Id. at 273.
28. THE THIRD BRANCH, BULLETIN OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Vol. 10, No. 6 at
4.
29. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, I AM. J. TRIAL AD.
215, 222.
30. The Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, August 21, 1979.
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tance to a large segment of society who are unable to afford the ser-
vices of private counsel.
B. Obligation of the Legal Profession to Provide Legal
Assistance
At the foundation of our legal system is the responsibility of the
legal profession to provide services to those who need them. Canon
Two of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A Lawyer
Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Le-
gal Counsel Available.""1 The responsibility of accepting court appoint-
ments or donating time and services to the disadvantaged rests with the
individual lawyer. Efforts of this nature, however, are often not enough
to meet the need, 2 therefore, it is incumbent upon the profession to
continue to support and develop legal assistance programs."
The Code of Professional Responsibility makes clear that the
availability of legal services should not be conditioned on the popular-
ity or unpopularity of the client or the cause.3'
[Tihe process of adjudication is surrounded by safeguards evolved from
centuries of experience ...All of this goes for not if the man with an
unpopular cause is unable to find a competent lawyer courageous enough
to represent him. His chance to have his day in court loses much of its
meaning if his case is handicapped from the outset by the very kind of
prejudgment our rules of evidence and procedure are designed to
31. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 2.
32. See for example, the discussion on prisoner need for legal assistance in sec-
tion C, infra.
33. The organized bar has been instrumental in fulfilling the aspirational sugges-
tions contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility by developing free legal clin-
ics, legal aid societies and related programs. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
EC 2-25.
34. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 2-27, EC 2-29. Students who
participate in a program designed to help prison inmates, particularly in the area of
civil rights, should be prepared for a certain degree of resentment or adverse commu-
nity reaction because the client has been convicted of a particularly heinous crime or
from prison administrators who may well be defendants in a law suit. See Jacob and
Sharma, Justice After Trial Prisoner's Need for Legal Services in the Criminal Cor-
rection Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 620 (1970).
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The concept of a fair trial in American jurisprudence assumes an
adversary presentation to an impartial tribunal." The availability of an
advocate for every client with a meritorious claim, regardless of its
popularity in the community is necessary to fulfill the ethical obligation
of the profession and insure the vitality of the judicial system. This
ethical obligation, however, does not stop at the practitioner. 7 Law
students, teachers and administrators should, therefore, aid the profes-
sion in the delivery of legal services. Perhaps those persons most in
need of, yet most deprived of legal services are incarcerated prisoners.
C. Prisoner Need for Legal Assistance
The total number of prisoner petitions filed in the United States
District Courts for the twelve month period ending June 30, 1978
reached 21,924.38 This represents a 907.1 percent increase over the
number of prisoner petitions filed in 1960.11 In 1978 alone, the number
of petitions increased 12.2 percent over the preceeding year." In light
of recent Supreme Court decisions extending the availability of the
courts to prisoners,"1 it is unlikely that the number of prisoner filings
will decrease.
Civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions comprise the over-
whelming majority of inmate filings." Although states are required to
35. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J.
1159, 1216 (1958).
36. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, EC 7-19.
37. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 336 (1974). 60
A.B.A.J. 859 (1974). The opinion makes clear that the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is applicable to the conduct of a lawyer at a time when the lawyer is not engaged
in the performance of his professional duties.
38. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C. March 9-10, 1978 and Sept. 21-22, 1978,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 1978 (Table 26) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
39. Id. at Table 27.
40. Id. at 197.
41. See the discussion on prisoners' right of access to the courts in section D this
text, infra.
42. ANNUAL REPORT at Table 26. The number of civil rights cases filed by in-
45
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
A Federal Litigation Program
4:1980
provide some form of legal assistance to inmates,43 neither civil rights
actions nor habeas corpus actions require the appointment of an attor-
ney in every case." Consequently, most 5 prisoner litigants must pro-
ceed pro se. "The typical pro se litigant is indigent, formally untutored
in the law and often uneducated."" In a survey conducted by the
United States Department of Justice, it was found that of the inmates
incarcerated in state correctional facilities, only one percent have com-
pleted four years or more of college. 7 Moreover, sixty-one percent
have not completed high school and twenty-six percent have completed
eighth grade or less.' The low level of educational attainment coupled
with the lack of legal assistance has had a marked effect on the success
of prisoner litigants proceeding pro se.'9 In light of the foregoing statis-
mates totaled 10,366 of which 9,730 were petitions by state prisoners. This represents
44.4 per cent of the total petitions filed. Habeas corpus petitions totaled 8,763. Id. at
197.
43. See, e.g., the discussion on prisoner right of access to the courts in section D,
infra.
44. See, e.g., Ross in note 61.
45. Exact statistics are not available. A recent survey has suggested that at least
85 per cent of the cases filed were without the services of an attorney. Of the districts
surveyed, 21.6 per cent represents the maximum amount of cases filed by attorneys.
See Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Fed-
eral Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979). For a further treatment on this subject see
Alpert and Miller, Legal Delivery Systems to Prisoners: A Preliminary Evaluation, 4
JUST. SYs. J. 9 (1978-79).
46. Zeigler and Herman, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Ac-
tions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 159 (1972).
47. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1978, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE (Table 6.27) [hereinafter cited as
SOURCEBOOK 1978].
48. Id. See also CENSUS OF PRISONERS IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
1973, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT Dec. 1976, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE at 7 which provides data of state in-
mates throughout the country. It was found that the median number of years of
schooling completed was about 10.5.
49. Turner, supra note 45 at 624, 625. Turner's article included a survey of 664
cases. The survey found that pro se litigants had little or no discovery. Those few who
did conduct discovery had difficulty in obtaining answers to interrogatories, requests
for admissions or the production of documents. Of the cases studied, only 18 had either
an evidentiary hearing or a trial.
v !
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tics, it seems apparent that prisoners cannot obtain "meaningful access
to the courts" without assistance from the legal community.
D. Prisoners' Right of Access to the Courts
The development of civil rights for prisoners has led to the aban-
donment of the archaic notion that those who are incarcerated not only
forfeit their liberty, but are, "for the time being, slaves of the state.""
Today, however, there is still a noted reluctance to accord the same
degree of constitutional protection to incarcerated citizens as is enjoyed
by those outside penal institutions."'" One area of particular impor-
tance to those who are incarcerated is the availability of a forum in
which to redress their grievances.
Beginning with Ex parte Hull52 in 1941, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized the prisoner's right to be free from impair-
ment by the state when seeking access to the courts. It was soon appar-
ent, however, that the court's decision in Hull required expansion.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions sought to insure that inmate ac-
cess to the court was meaningful. Cases such as Burns v. Ohio53 and
Smith v. Bennett54 struck down state procedures which "effectively
foreclosed access"55 to the courts by requiring indigent prisoners to pay
docket and filing fees.
50. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (Ct. App. 1871).
51. See, Turk, Access to the Federal Courts by State Prisoners in Civil Rights
Actions, 64 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1358 (1978).
52. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). A prisoner attempted to file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to the United States Supreme Court. A prison rule which required all
legal documents to be submitted to the institutional welfare office prevented him from
filing. The Supreme Court struck down this regulation holding that "the State and its
officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a
writ of habeas corpus." 312 U.S. at 349.
53. 360 U.S. 252 (1959). The petitioner attempted to proceed in forma pauperis
and applied for leave to appeal his conviction for burglary to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Court denied the request because he could not pay the docket and filing fees. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio's decision had
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
54. 365 U.S. 708 (1961). The United States Supreme Court struck down an
Iowa law which required the payment of filing fees by an indigent prisoner before a
habeas corpus application would be docketed.
55. 360 U.S. 252, 257.
1386
Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
47
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
A Federal Litigation Program
1 4:1980
In the years following Burns and Smith, the courts continued to
limit regulations that hampered the prisoner's ability to obtain effective
access. The prevailing theme of these decisions was that "the duty of
the state is merely negative; it may not act in such a manner as to
interfere with the individual exercise of such federal rights.""6 For ex-
ample, the state may not prohibit inmates from assisting other prison-
ers in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief," nor may law stu-
dents and legal paraprofessionals be banned from conducting attorney-
client interviews with inmates.5" The courts, however, applying a test of
reasonableness, have upheld some restrictive regulations and policies
imposed by the state.' The burden was placed on the prison authorities
to justify the regulations by showing evidence of adequate
alternatives. 0
56. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 834 (1977).
57. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The petitioner here, was serving a
life sentence in the Tennessee State Penitentiary. He was transferred to the maximum
security building in the prison for violation of a prison regulation which prohibited an
inmate from assisting others in legal matters. In a "motion for law books and a type-
writer," he sought relief from his confinement in the maximum security building. The
district court treated the motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, after a
hearing, ordered him released and restored to the status of an ordinary prisoner. The
sixth circuit reversed but on appeal to the Supreme Court the district court's decision
was upheld. The Supreme Court ruled that: unless and until the State provides some
reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of post-conviction relief, it
may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from
furnishing such assistance to other prisoners. 393 U.S. at 490.
58. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1973). See also Soster v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971). It was improper for state prison warden to delete mate-
rial from prisoner correspondence to his attorney. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1971). Texas prison regulation banning inmate assistance in the preparation of
legal materials was held unconstitutional even though the State contended that reason-
able alternatives were in existence. Souza v. Travisono, 498 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1974).
Court struck down state policy which prohibited law students from assisting inmates.
Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188 (2nd Cir. 1976). Writ writer who was prevented
from giving assistance to inmates had standing to vindicate the right of prisoners to
petition the courts.
59. See, Soster v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971), upholding prison
regulation which prohibited prisoners from sharing law books and requiring the books
to be acquired through prison officials. Collins v. Haga, 373 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Va.
1974). State not required to provide inmate with access to law library when two attor-
neys were available to assist prisoners.
60. See, Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); Corpus v. Estelle, 551
- !
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Historically, there have been few areas in which states have had an
affirmative duty to expend resources so that prisoners could gain mean-
ingful access to the courts. This has occurred in criminal and habeas
corpus actions which assert a federal right that is constitutional in na-
ture."' The scope of the state's obligation was expanded in Gilmore v.
Lynch"2 and crystallized in Bounds v. Smith. 3 In Gilmore the court
struck down a regulation which restricted the prison law library to
specified materials. Prison officials were required to either expand their
library collection or "adopt some new method of satisfying the legal
needs of its charges."" In Bounds, the United States Supreme Court
established beyond doubt "that prisoners have a constitutional right of
access to the courts." 6 Moreover, Bounds places an affirmative obliga-
tion upon the state "to insure that inmate access to the courts is ade-
quate, effective and meaningful." 6 This is a fundamental, constitu-
tional right which "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prison-
ers with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.' 6 7
F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1977).
61. See, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.12 (1956). State must provide trial records to
indigent inmates. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Counsel must be ap-
pointed for indigent inmates seeking to appeal their convictions. Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966). State must provide transcript of post-conviction proceed-
ings. Roberts v. La Valle, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). State must provide preliminary hearing
transcript. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969). State must provide habeas
corpus transcript. One of the few cases in which the State did not have an affirmative
burden was Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) which held that counsel does not have
to be appointed for discretionary appeals.
62. 319 F Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd. per curium, Younger v. Gilmore,
404 U.S. 15 (1971).
63. 430 U.S. 817.
64. 404 U.S. at 112.
65. 430 U.S. at 821. Here, state prison inmates of North Carolina filed civil
rights suits alleging that the state, "by failing to provide them with adequate legal
library facilities, was denying them reasonable access to the courts and equal protec-
tion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." The district court, rely-
ing on Gilmore, held for the prisoners. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court.
66. Id. at 822.
67. Id. at 828. The court suggested several alternatives which are available to the
state. These include:
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The implication of Bounds is that adequate law libraries are syno-
nomous with "meaningful access" and, therefore, some courts have en-
ded their analysis once the question of adequacy has been resolved. For
example, in O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 8 the court rejected
the proposed contents of a prison library because it contained "nothing
to assist prisoners in preparing legal papers to challenge the conditions
of their confinement. . . ."I' Accordingly, the court ordered the addi-
tion of titles eighteen, twenty-eight and forty-two of the United States
Code and a manual on prisoner's civil rights litigation.'" In Fluhr v.
Roberts7 however, the court found the library in O'Bryan "overly
meager" and required the inclusion of numerous additional volumes.7
Even though libraries have been made "adequate" by the addition
of proper lawbooks, an inmate's right of access may still be effectively
foreclosed. Some problems such as restrictive library regulations, im-
proper supervision and intimidation are readily susceptible to adminis-
trative remedy.73 However, ignorance and illiteracy7 among the inmate
population raises the question of whether law libraries along can ever
provide meaningful access. Some courts have recognized this problem
and fashioned remedies which prohibit the states from denying an in-
mate the right to seek legal assistance. Thus, jailhouse lawyers or the
assistance of other prisoners cannot be barred by the state until some
the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers' supervi-
sion, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or infor-
mal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar as-
sociations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis,
and the use of full-time staff attorneys, working either in new prison legal assis-
tance organizations or as part of public defender or legal services offices.
430 U.S. at 831.
68. 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. N.D. 1977).
69. Id. at 601.
70. Id.
71. 460 F. Supp. 536 (W.D. Ken. 1978).
72. Id. at 537-538.
73. In Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978), and Wolfish v. Levi, 573
F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1978), library hours were extended as a means of ensuring "mean-
ingful access" to the courts. In Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Penn.
1978), the court held that vandalism of law books could be controlled by proper
supervision.
74. See the discussion on prisoner need for legal assistance in section C, supra.
, !
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other reasonable form of assistance is made available.75 These solu-
tions, however, are wholly inadequate because the law is an intricate
and complex subject. It has been suggested "that one untrained in the
law, though wise and sensible, is severely handicapped in attempting to
provide legal assistance.""6
The states obligation to provide inmates with "adequate, effective,
and meaningful" access under Bounds cannot be satisfied by providing
anything less than assistance from individuals trained in the law. Thus,
in Hooks v. Wainwright,77 the State of Florida was compelled to take
over the financial support of a prison assistance program which had
previously been federally funded. Battle v. Anderson"8 has taken the
Hooks rationale further by requiring the State of Oklahoma to imple-
ment and fund an inmate legal assistance program. Law schools de-
veloping federal litigation programs may want to utilize this line of
cases to compel the states to provide administrative and financial
assistance.
III. PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL TRIAL
LITIGATION PROGRAM
The Model Rule for Student Practice in federal courts serves as
the foundation upon which law schools can construct federal litigation
programs.8 0 The guidelines set forth in the Rule include requirements
75. Cf Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1979) and Graham v. Hutto,
437 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Va. 1977).
76. Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F. Supp. 1131 at 1146-1147 n.7 (W.D. Wisc. 1978).
77. 578 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1978). Hooks was a civil rights action brought by
inmates of Florida's correctional institutions who claimed that they were receiving in-
sufficient legal books and services to meet the "constitutional mandate of effective in-
mate access to courts." See also, Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Penn. 1978)
where the court held that the closing of an in-prison law clinic was violative of a pris-
oner's constitutional rights under Bounds.
78. 457 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Okla. 1978). This was an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine if Oklahoma prison officials were complying with prison orders in an inmate
action challenging the conditions of their confinement. One of the issues before the
court was the adequacy of a prison law library. Despite the "presence of a minimally
adequate library," the court found that it was insufficient to provide "meaningful
access."
79. Id. at 739.
80. See note 23 supra.
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for students, supervisors, and programs."s Under the Rule, the student
practitioner is required to have completed at least three semesters of
legal studies, or the equivalent; have knowledge of the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility; be certified by the dean of the law school as being of
good character and sufficient legal ability; and be certified by the
court."2
Supervisors are of central importance as the success of the pro-
gram depends upon their guidance. The Rule requires that a supervisor
must have faculty status and be certified by the dean and the court.
The supervisor must also be admitted to practice in the court in which
the students are certified; be present with the student at all times when
conducting court business; and co-sign all pleadings or documents filed
with the court. The committee also suggested a limit of ten students
per faculty supervisor." There are certain intangible characteristics de-
sirable in developing a profile of a supervising attorney. It is essential
for the supervisor to be a skilled litigator. This is necessary because the
ultimate responsibility for ensuring competent representation of the in-
mates devolves upon the supervisor. While it is hoped that the students
will provide competent representation, the supervisor must be prepared
to step in, if necessary, to protect the client's interests.
What makes an individual a skilled litigator is a question upon
which reasonable minds may differ. Law schools, therefore, should be
left free to develop their own criteria. There are, however, several fac-
tors which should be taken into consideration. For example, there is
some empirical data which suggests that there is a correlation between
litigation, experience and competency.8 Moreover, it may be desirable
81. SUPPLEMENT C, FINAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES FOR LIM-
ITED ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW STUDENT TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, February, 1978 at 1, 2 [hereinafter cited as SUP-
PLEMENT C].
82. Id. at 5. In addition, the committee commented that high academic standing
is not sine qua non to the program but that interest, motivation and supervision are
more determinative of the student practitioner's success than grades. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 10, 11. The supervisor must also assume personal professional respon-
sibility for the students' guidance and be responsible for supplementing the students'
work when necessary to serve the client's interests.
84. See notes 16 and 17, supra.
4 :1_, 9 8 0 391 1
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or even essential that the supervisor have considerable familiarity with
the federal courts since many facets of the federal judiciary system dif-
fer or do not exist in the state courts. s5 The supervisor must also pos-
sess the ability to inculcate the student with the requisite skills of trial
advocacy. This is a difficult quality to identify and one upon which
opinions may be desparate. Again, law schools should be left free to
fashion their own criteria. A federal litigation program, however, will
require the supervisor to devote an inordinate amount of time and ef-
fort. Dedication and enthusiasm may prove to be essential traits. Law
schools should also develop a system for weeding out supervisors who
prove to be ineffective. One method which should be utilized is an an-
nual evaluation by both students and faculty. The evaluation should
focus upon the supervisor's skill as a litigator as well as the supervi-
sor's ability to develop these skills in the student.
Implementation of a federal litigation program necessarily raises
many questions. Who selects the cases, what criteria guide the selec-
tion, and what type of restrictions should be placed on selection? Few
restrictions exist in the Model Rule which permits student representa-
tion of any client including federal, state, or local government bodies in
any criminal, civil, or administrative matter. The rule requires that a
written letter of consent from the client be obtained in order for the
student to appear on his behalf."6 It also requires that the program be
certified by the court, conducted to avoid schedule conflicts with the
court, and to maintain malpractice insurance. 7 While the student may
not accept payment for services, the program may receive compensa-
tion from sources other than the client." Variations and modifications
of the Rule are expected and depend primarily upon the particular
needs of the program and the jurisdiction in which it lies. For example,
85. Issues such as standing, ripeness, mootness, the abstention doctrines, as well
as statutorily imposed jurisdictional questions are but a few of the problems which may
be encountered. In addition, the supervisor must have a working knowledge of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellate Procedure, and Evidence.
86. SUPPLEMENT C at 17.
87. Id. at 7. Malpractice insurance covering law school clinical programs has
been made available by Lloyds of London. See Jacob and Sharma, supra note 34, at
619, 620.
88. Id. at 7. For example, compensation is authorized under certain circum-
stances by the Criminal Justice Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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student requirements may be expanded to include orientation classes"'
and specific areas of study related to the litigation anticipated."
Thus far, twenty-five district courts and three circuit courts of ap-
peal have adopted the Model Rule." Other restrictions, such as the
extent to which students are allowed to participate is governed by the
particular form of the local rule, and the discretion of the presiding
judge.' While many courts permit students to practice before the
bench, some do not. 3 It is, therefore, incumbent upon the American
Bar Association, law schools, students, and other members of the legal
profession to push for the adoption of the Model Rule and aid in its
implementation. 4
The Model Rule, however, does not address the questions of who
selects the cases and what criteria guide the selection. Practical consid-
erations dictate that the litigation program rather than the courts
should select the cases. The federal courts should not have to assume
the administrative burden which case selection could create. Moreover,
it is inappropriate for judges to rule on the potential merits of a pris-
oner's complaint particularly in pro se actions where inmates may have
legitimate grievances but lack the legal training and expertise to prop-
89. An orientation clinic may require the students to observe several trials in
federal court to familiarize them with the manner in which federal litigation is con-
ducted. Also, if the program is concerned with inmate assistance, an indoctrination to
prison administrative rules and regulations and an introduction to the inner workings
of the enforcement agencies may be advisable.
90. In prisoner litigation, for example, a civil rights course on habeas corpus and
§ 1983 actions should be made a prerequisite to student participation in the program.
91. THE SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, THE COUN-
SEL ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION, June 1, 1979, Table 7 at
113 and the explanation thereof at xix.
92. SUPPLEMENT C at 15.
93. Id. at Appendix D
94. The Model Rule may be implemented through a variety of suggested alterna-
tives. The Two Year law school would reduce the traditional three year course of study
and devote what would be the third year, to clinical study. The Two Year Plus law
school would award a J.M. degree after two years with the following year involving
specialty training in a "lawyer school" operated by the bar. The Two-One-One model
provides that after two years of formal instruction, one year be spent in practice with
an additional year of formal instruction to follow. Another alternative, Specialized
Tracking, would allow the student to concentrate on one of two areas of law within a
three year format. For an in depth discussion and analysis see Gee and Jackson supra
note 2. at 843-857.
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erly articulate their problem. Judges should not have to act as their
advocates in these situations. This function should be left to the litiga-
tion program where inmate interviews could determine whether there is
merit to the case.
The criteria which the litigation program utilizes in making case
selection must conform to the lawyer's ethical duties to client and
court. Thus, while the probable educational value of the case may be
taken into consideration, it should never be the sole criterion. The de-
terminative factor in case selection must be merit, for to do otherwise
would violate the Code of Professional Responsibility." Each litigation
program should be free to determine the priority which is assigned to
cases. The size and resources of the program may influence case selec-
tion. Impact cases which attack systemic problems may require large
expenditures of time and funds with the litigation lasting many years.
A smaller program may wish to avoid these problems and place prior-
ity in cases which have both merit and educational value. Hopefully,
litigation programs will progress to the point where they are capable of
handling a complete client service and all inmates with a meritorious
claim will be able to obtain legal assistance.
A federal litigation program could be initiated by utilizing pris-
oner pro se complaints already on the court dockets." Ultimately, liti-
gation programs should include the writing and filing of complaints for
prisoners. This would provide experience for the student at early stages
in the legal process including counseling, factual research, and drafting
pleadings. In addition, the litigation program might reduce the over-
loaded court dockets 7 by weeding out frivolous complaints."
Law schools cannot rely on the federal courts to compel the states
95. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 7-4.
96. See, e.g., Zeigler and Herman supra note 46. The article suggests that pro se
litigants account for nearly 20 per cent of the caseload handled annually by the federal
courts.
97. ANNUAL REPORT Table 5 at 105.
98. In Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978) the court noted that a
South Carolina Law School clinical program had a "dramatical statistical effect in the
reduction of meritless prisoner cases . . . ." Id. at 1155 n.5. One of the most interest-
ing prisoner pro se complaints relates the story of an inmate who alleged that he was
being controlled by Martians who were using rays on him. The district court judge
wanted to placate the prisoner so he enjoined the Martians from further use of the
rays. Zeigler and Herman supra note 46, at 165 n. 17.
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to fund federal litigation programs under the Bounds-Hooks-Battle line
of cases. Funding, therefore, may be sought from a variety of sources.
Congress has earmarked one million dollars for the funding of clinical
legal education programs." Bar organizations, the Federal Law En-
forcement Assistance Administrations, and the Criminal Justice Act,'0'
provide additional sources. Funding is an important factor in the suc-
cess of advocacy programs. The law student-professor ratio causes a
higher expenditure per student. If more academic credit was given for
participation in the programs, a greater percentage of tuition money
could logically be allotted to them. Graduates with more experience in
trial work who demonstrate a high degree of competence are worth the
costs of the proposed programs. In addition, some statutes provide for
the prevailing party to be awarded attorney fees.' 0' These fees could be
used to defray the cost of a litigation program.
IV. FEDERAL TRIAL LITIGATION: THE NOVA
EXPERIMENT
In the fall of 1978, a small group of Nova University law students
were given a unique opportunity to participate in a civil rights trial in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
before the Honorable James Lawrence King.'"' Professor Tobias Si-
mon '0 designed and supervised the program in which seven students'"4
99. SUPPLEMENT C at 26. The funds are available through the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare with a limitation of $75,000 per grant.
100. Id. at 24.
101. See note 88 supra.
102. Judge King was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Procedures and Stan-
dards, part of the Devitt Committee. This subcommittee urged the Federal Judicial
Center to research the issue of trial advocacy. The Model Rule was ultimately drafted
and adopted as a result of the research.
103. B.A., 1949 Hofstra University; J.D., 1952 Harvard Law School; Member of
the Florida Bar Association and in private practice in Miami since 1952; Member of
the Florida Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission 1966-
68; Co-author with Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Arthur J. England Jr., Flor-
ida Appellate Remedies (D & S. Publishers, 1979); Adjunct professor of law, Florida
State University 1974-76, Nova University 1978-79.
104. The group was originally comprised of the following second and third year
law students: Carolyn Bingham, Dwight Evans, Randy Freedman, Howard Lundy,
Thomas J. Ross II, Marc Silverman, and Dianne Stephanis (the designated group
o !I
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represented Jesse Tafero, an indigent plaintiff. The experience reflects
some of the more difficult problems which a federal litigation program
is likely to face. Students must be prepared to deal with animosity be-
cause of the unpopularity of the client or cause. There are logistical
problems of getting law students to prisons which are often located in
remote areas. There are also security problems which arise in getting a
group of students into prison so that they can interview a client.
The Nova experiment encountered one of the most unpopular situ-
ations envisioned in a federal litigation program. Mr. Tafero was a
convicted murdered awaiting execution on death row in Florida State
Prison when Professor Simon and the students were appointed coun-
sel.' "5 The case originated in August, 1976 when Mr. Tafero filed a pro
se complaint alleging that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his
civil rights subsequent to his arrest and incarceration. 0 He sought
$20,000 from each defendant, all officers and employees of the Brow-
ard County Sheriff's Department. While a certain amount of animosity
might be expected, the difficulties encountered were relatively minor.' 07
More importantly, Mr. Tafero's status did not affect the group's right
to interview their client. The authorities were cooperative in allowing
students into prison despite potential security problems. The five hour
trip to Florida State Prison proved to be the most difficult aspect.
Normally, any federal litigation program will, as its inherent goal,
introduce students to a variety of legal and procedural questions. In
leader).
105. In the spring of 1976, Mr. Tafero was convicted of murdering a Florida
Highway Patrolman and a Canadian Constable. See State v. Tafero, No. 76-1275 CF
10 (17th Cir. Ct. Fla.).
106. The students ascertained that five distinct matters were at issue: First, Mr.
Tafero alleged that incident to his arrest, booking and interrogation he was threatened,
physically abused, and kept in constant fear for his life. Second, Mr. Tafero alleged
that two days after the first incident, he was forcibly removed from his cell, stripped,
assaulted and beaten. The third and fourth incidents contained allegations that police
officers struck Mr. Tafero with a flashlight and a television antenna. Finally, Mr.
Tafero alleged that he was bound and shackled to the bars of his cell for two hours and
a gag placed over his mouth when he complained about the procedure for using the
showers.
107. The students found that in discussing the case, many people were outspoken
in their beliefs, saying that a "cop-killer," could not be believed or, assuming the inci-
dents were true, that "he deserved it." In addition, many people had the mistaken idea
that a favorable verdict would allow Mr. Tafero to go free.
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Tafero for example, the students focused on providing the factual alle-
gations of the complaint. 0 The theory of recovery arose, as it does in
many prisoner suits,109 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.110 The students had to
develop proof of an action by any person acting under color of law
which causes a deprivation of constitutionally secured rights."' It was
therefore essential to the establishment of a prima facie case", that Mr.
Tafero testify because there were no other witnesses who could corrob-
orate all of the allegations in the complaint."' The problem, however,
was Mr. Tafero's incarceration in prison. To secure his presence, a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum" was drafted asking for the
production of the plaintiff for trial and outlining the necessity of his
testimony. Although the writ was granted, defense counsel subsequent-
ly filed a Motion for Proper Security Measures at Time of Trial re-
questing that the plaintiff be bound and shackled. Oral argument was
108. Before the students entered the case, a special magistrate's report was fur-
nished to Mr. Tafero which contained various police documents. Departmental memos
provided a wealth of information which could be utilized at trial. In one memo, for
example, one of the defendants denied that any beating or assault took place but did
admit that Mr. Tafero was stripped so that his clothes could be tested by the lab for
bloodstains. The report stated that when Mr. Tafero refused to comply with a request
for his clothes, the officer, along with others, aided in their removal. In another memo,
a different defendant denied any wrongdoing stating that Mr. Tafero was handcuffed
because he was banging the cell walls and screaming. The memo also stated that a shirt
was tied across Mr. Tafero's mouth for two minutes because he spat upon an officer.
109. See note 42 supra.
110. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1978) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proceeding for redress.
11. See note 49 supra.
112. For the classic discussion on the elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). A prima facie case had to be established in Tafero in
order to withstand a motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 FED. R. Civ. P.
113. There was one witness, a former cellmate of the plaintiff, who could testify
on behalf of Mr. Tafero, but this pertained to only one incident.
114. "At common law, the writ, meaning 'you have the body to testify,' used to
bring up a prisoner detained in a jail or prison to give evidence before the court."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). A writ was also drafted for Mr. Tafero's
cellmate (see note 113, supra) who is serving a life sentence in the Florida State Prison.
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heard and Judge King denied the motion.11 These problems will un-
doubtedly be encountered by other litigation programs. The fact that
Mr. Tafero was permitted to appear in court despite his conviction for
murder, indicates that such obstacles can be overcome.
The Tafero trial exposed the students to many of the tools utilized
by the practicing attorney. Trial tactics for example, were developed
based upon interviews with witnesses, depositions, interrogatories, and
pretrial discovery. Potential problems had to be anticipated and
researched."' The students also learned the mechanical aspects of prac-
ticing law such as the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum"I and how
to subpoena a witness. When the trial commenced, the students were
free to handle every aspect of Mr. Tafero's case. They argued several
motions in limine,"8 submitted voir dire"' questions to the judge,' ° im-
paneled the jury, and gave opening statements before the court recessed
for the day. On the second day of the trial, it came to the attention of
115. Prior to the hearing, the students practiced oral argument emphasizing the
point that if the motion was granted, the physical restraints on the plaintiff would have
a prejudicial effect on the jury.
116. One of the problems anticipated was a hearsay question as to whether sev-
eral attorneys who had contact with Mr. Tafero at varying times after each of the
alleged incidents, could testify as to what he said to them. Rule 802 FED. R. EVID. states,
"hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
Under Rule 801(c) FED. R. EVID. hearsay is defined as ". . a statement, other than the
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." The students hoped to have the statements
admitted into evidence under Rule 803(1), (2), or (3) FED. R. EVID. which makes a
hearsay statement admissible when used to describe a present sense impression, excited
utterance, or a then existing mental, emotional or physical condition.
117. Pursuant to Rule 30(b) and 45(b) FED. R. Civ. P. a subpoena duces tecum
may be issued to compel non-parties to provide material necessary to the case.
118. "A written motion which is usually made bef6re or after the beginning of a
jury trial for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 914 (5th ed. 1979).
119. "To speak the truth. This phrase denotes the preliminary examination
which the court may make of one presented as a witness or juror, where his compe-
tency, interest, etc., is objected to." Id., at 1412.
120. The students' experience with the Tafero trial made them realize that peo-
ple had many prejudices and misconceptions. Questions were developed to minimize
these problems. For example, the jurors were asked whether they understood that this
was a civil suit and that it would not affect Mr. Tafero's criminal conviction.
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the court that the defendants' attorney intended to cross-examine the
plaintiff about facts surrounding the murders for which he was con-
victed.' Mr. Tafero's convictions were on appeal and since he did not
take the witness stand at his criminal trial, he did not wish to testify to
facts in this case that could be used against him if he was subsequently
granted a new trial. After hearing oral arguments on this issue, Judge
King ruled that the questioning had to be permitted to ensure a fair
presentation of the issue. As a result of this ruling, the plaintiff chose
to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) Fed. R. Civ. P.11 thereby preserving his right to refile the com-
plaint after the disposition of his criminal appeal.
Although the case never went to the jury, the Nova experiment in
federal trial litigation provided invaluable experience for the students.
Every individual in the group had to prepare memoranda of law to
accompany their motions to the court.12 This procedure develops writ-
ing skills which are essential to the trial practitioner. There were also
many hours of preparation which, though never utilized at trial, helped
develop the students' litigation skills. There were simulation sessions,
for example, in direct and cross-examination which required the group
to construct their line of questions and develop trial tactics. This prepa-
ration, coupled with the groups trial experience instilled a tremendous
sense of self-confidence in the students, and a real understanding of the
time, energy, and dedication needed to develop the skills of trial
121. Because of the importance of the issue, Professor Simon argued against
permitting this line of questioning stating that such testimony was irrelevant and infla-
matory. He informed the court that Mr. Tafero would invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
122. Rule 41(a)(2) FED. R. Civ. P. provides:
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independant adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
123. Rule 10(A) of the local rules of the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida requires that a written memorandum of law citing supporting authorities
accompany every motion. Rule 10(C) of the local rules requires each party opposing
the motion to file a reply memorandum within five days after service of the motion.
• I
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advocacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The participation of law students in federal trial litigation is an
idea whose time has come. The development of prisoner access cases
coupled with inmate need for legal assistance places a tremendous bur-
den upon the legal profession. Individual efforts by practicing members
of the bar have not been sufficient to meet the needs of prisoners. The
ethical obligation of the legal profession, therefore, mandates the devel-
opment of alternative delivery systems to remedy this problem. This
obligation is of particular importance in prisoner suits where the cause
or the client may prove to be unpopular. Moreover, litigation programs
are an ideal proving ground for the training of students in skills neces-
sary for competent advocacy. The expectations may be high for a pro-
gram that has not been tested, but no other objectives could be of
greater service to our legal system than the attainment of these goals.
Randy R. Freedman
Thomas J. Ross H
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